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Abstract
Essays on Universal Basic Income
by
Nana Mukbaniani
Adviser: Professor Sangeeta Pratap
Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a program in which individuals receive a regular sum of
money, usually from the government. The transfer amount is thought to be unconditional
of income and enough to cover all subsistence needs. Such a system is easy and cheap to
administer because the government does not need to check the eligibility of each applicant.
UBI programs are growing as more cities, states and countries (Stockton, California, Newark,
New Jersey, Ontario, Canada, Kenya, Finland, Germany, Spain, China, etc) implement
experiments of such programs. The idea of a UBI is gaining ground in the U.S.. One of
the main responses of the U.S. to high unemployment caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
and quarantine was a modified version of a temporary country-wide UBI program in 2020
(CARES Act). 30 mayors across the U.S. created a coalition - Mayors for a Guaranteed
Income - to explore cash payment programs and address the racial wealth inequality.
UBI is actively discussed to be a potential policy that can mitigate adverse impact of
accelerated automation on wages and employment. Thus, it is important to understand
what we have learned from UBI experiments, what macroeconomic models predict in the
UBI environment, and what is the best approach to implement such programs.
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
Chapter 1 In the first chapter I review the literature on a Universal Basic Income (UBI)
policy. I explore the UBI experiments that have been conducted worldwide, their limitations,
v
and lessons that we have learned from them. I also review the macroeconomic models
that address the idea of unconditional transfers, their limitations and the required future
developments to evaluate how UBI works in a more complex and realistic environment.
Chapter 2 In this chapter, I use general equilibrium model of heterogeneous agents to
evaluate the impact of the UBI system, on aggregate levels and distributions of wealth, con-
sumption, labor, and welfare. I contrast this with a targeted transfers system where people
need to meet certain eligibility criteria (usually, income) to qualify for transfers. I find that
in the UBI system with $1,000 monthly payments, the level of aggregate capital falls by 16%
and the inequality of wealth increases no matter how the UBI system is financed: through
taxes or through foreign aid. Guaranteed payments induce people to save less because of less
precautionary needs. As precautionary savings motive is stronger for the asset poor, people
in the lowest wealth quintiles reduce their savings more, which increases the inequality of
wealth. Even though the welfare of the least skilled and the asset poor increases significantly
because of unconditional transfers, the tax-financed UBI system requires a consumption tax
rate to be equal to 43% that slightly reduces the welfare of the wealthier. Even though con-
sumption tax rate is unrealistically high, the effective consumption tax rate (consumption
tax net of transfers) decreases on average and aggregate welfare increases by 15.7% as mea-
sured by consumption equivalent variation. A hybrid model with both targeted transfers and
partial UBI (monthly payments of $500) with low, 5% capital income tax rate (to encourage
savings) is more efficient as it provides significant, almost 8% gain in welfare with only 22%
consumption tax rate and without compromising output or welfare of the asset rich.
Chapter 3 In this chapter, I study the impact of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) policy
on aggregate output and welfare when there is an automation of production technologies.
When the productivity of robots increases, robots substitute for labor and thus, the share
vi
of labor in value added decreases. I use general equilibrium models with heterogeneous
agents who face idiosyncratic earnings risk and Cobb-Douglas technology with Traditional
Capital and Labor Services. Traditional capital does not include robots and can be employed
in production only with labor services. Labor services is a CES nest of robot capital and
Human capital that can substitute each other. I calibrate the economy to match the evolution
of the labor share in the last three decades. If the productivity of robots doubles, I find
that output increases in the new equilibrium and the welfare of wealth poor households
decreases significantly resulting in more than 6% decrease in aggregate welfare (measured as
consumption equivalent variation, CEV). In such a setting, the transition to a UBI system
increases welfare significantly, by more than 15%, however, reduces output by 12% because
it reduces the precautionary savings motive. The hybrid system in which every household
receives 50% of subsistence requirement and the eligibility threshold for targeted transfers
equals 50% of subsistence requirement works well as it is less detrimental to output while
increasing aggregate welfare by 4% as CEV. Further increase in output in the UBI and
Hybrid systems can be achieved by a lower capital income tax rate.
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Chapter 1
Universal Basic Income: Review of
Experiments and Theory
1.1 Introduction
Universal Basic Income (UBI) programs have been advocated by many economists and po-
litical scientists (such as Meade 1948, Tobin 1966, Friedman 1966, Atkinson 1995, Van Parijs
2004, and etc) as a potential policy that can overcome poverty. Universal Basic Income is
a program that pays a subsistence transfer to every resident regardless of their income or
employment status, is simple to administer, and thus, is thought to be an attractive policy to
replace the current transfers system that are targeted to different low income groups. Also,
unconditional cash transfers give people a dignity of choice as opposed to targeted transfers.
As discussed by former US president Richard Nixon, “Current welfare robs recipients of dig-
nity. Benefit levels are grossly unequal. . . For the first time, the government would recognize
that it has no less an obligation to the working poor than to the nonworking poor1.” Van Par-
ijs (1998) discusses that while capitalism provides more freedom in contrast with socialism,
1https://www.givedirectly.org/basic-income
1
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it widens the inequality that itself restricts the freedom of disadvantaged households. Thus,
he considers that a UBI system can provide a real freedom for all. Additionally, Calsamiglia
and Flamand (2019), Lowrey (2018), Yang (2018) discuss that the universal basic income
system is crucial to support people especially in the era of automation.
The idea of Universal Basic Income (UBI) programs became more popular in the COVID-
19 pandemic, when as a result of a quarantine orders many people lost their jobs. Unemploy-
ment rate reached historic maximum of 14.7%2 in the U.S. since the Great Depression. In
addition to this, many informal sector workers lost their jobs at the time when people were
advised to stock food to be prepared for quarantine3. Thus, regular unemployment insurance
programs were not sufficient to support people. Therefore, the U.S. government introduced
the CARES Act4 that provided additional unemployment insurance programs and extensions
of the eligibility period as well as stimulus checks and was the first U.S. federal transfer that
carried the idea of UBI with some restrictions. 30 Mayors of different U.S. cities created a
coalition Mayors for Guaranteed Income5 to explore and advocate guaranteed income.
Opponents of UBI discuss several disadvantages of such programs. First, cash recipients
might misuse funds and spend it on alcohol or on other addictive items. Second, they will
have less incentives to work. And, Third, financing UBI system requires a lot of funds for
which the government will need to increase tax rates that will have distortionary effect on
production.
To better understand the impact of Universal Basic Income programs, multiple UBI ex-
periments have been conducted worldwide. Even though evidence of the UBI experiments
suggests significant improvements in the well-being of transfer recipients, no increased spend-
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as there has been no pure long-term nationwide UBI policy.
As implementation of such programs require a lot of funding, it is very important to
understand the impact of UBI programs on households’ savings and consumption and their
impact on aggregate output and welfare.
In this paper I review universal basic income experiments and macroeconomic frameworks
to understand the advantages and disadvantage of UBI as well as limitations of current UBI
research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the UBI experiments,
and section 1.3 provides implications of UBI in macroeconomic model frameworks. Section
1.4 investigates the role of UBI in the presence of rapid labor displacing technical change,
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Universal Basic Income Experiments
Different forms of Universal Basic Income programs have been experimented with world-
wide. Most of the experiments intended to evaluate the impact of guaranteed payments on
employment and well-being. However, more evidence is needed about the impact of basic
income on savings, consumption, education, and health. Also, in most of the experiments,
cash recipients were only income-poor households and funds were provided through the char-
ity, thus, we cannot extend the findings of such experiments on the whole economy where
tax-financed UBI will be paid to every resident.
Marinescu (2018) reviews some of the programs that have characteristics of Universal
Basic Income Programs. The best example of large-scale and long-run unconditional cash
transfers is the Alaska Permanents Fund Dividend that is a diversified portfolio investment in
oil reserves royalties and distributes dividends to all Alaskan residents every year. The size of
the dividend depends on the performance of the fund. It ranged from $331 (paid in 1984) to
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$2, 072 (in 2015). Jones and Marinescu (2018) analyze this unconditional cash transfers pro-
gram using synthetic controls and difference-in differences methods. The authors find that
the overall labor supply does not change, while part-time employment increases. In general,
income effect created by unconditional cash transfers should reduce employment, however,
as Jones and Marinescu (2018) discuss, cash infusion increases demand that increases em-
ployment mainly in non-tradable sector. Their evidence also suggests that extensive margin
of employment increases that means more people in the labor force. However, more workers
switch from full-time jobs to a part-time employment. Yonzan et al. (2020) find that Alaska’s
cash transfers increased fertility by 13.1% and reduced spacing between births.
Another larger-scale and long-term UBI program is the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indi-
ans Casino Dividend program that has been paying $4, 000 − $6, 000 yearly to every tribal
member of the tribal land in North Carolina since 1997. Akee et al. (2010) uses difference-in-
differences methods and find no response of either aggregate labor supply or part-time work
on cash transfers. They also find increased education, reduced criminal, improved mental
health and less dependence on alcohol and cannabis among Native Americans relative to
non-Natives. Akee et al. (2010) finds no impact of transfers on the household composition
and marital status.
The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Casino
Dividend programs provide good insight in behavioral responses of UBI, however, other
aspects of unconditional transfers have not been evaluated. Also, such programs are not
perfectly comparable to the idea of pure UBI. Although the transfers are universal and
unconditional, it does not replace other transfer programs and, thus, its outcomes will differ
from a pure UBI system. Besides, even though the annual transfer amounts per person are
generous, they are not enough to meet basic needs (the federal poverty threshold for annual
income is around $12,0006), and consequently people’s responses will be different than in a
6https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/federal-poverty-level-fpl/
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full UBI system with subsistence transfers. Lastly, conceptually these kinds of payments are
more like dividends and not transfers and are not tax-financed.
Iran started a nation-wide UBI program in 2011, where the government paid 29% of
median income to family accounts. Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2017) found no
evidence of reduced labor supply while they found increased hours of work in the service
sector. This finding is similar to Marinescu (2018) and Akee et al. (2010). However, this
research analyzes only one-year outcomes of this program and is of limited use in providing
the information on long-run effects on economic variables.
Finland conducted a 2-year basic income experiment in which randomly selected 2,000
unemployed individuals received an unconditional transfer from the government7. Kangas
et al. (2019) find improvement of well-being and no effect on employment. The limitation of
this experiment is that it has an eligibility criteria of been unemployed.
The Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) paid $500 monthly un-
conditional transfer for 18 months to randomly selected 125 Stockton residents whose income
was below median8. The SEED is led by the city’s Mayor Michael D. Tubbs and is funded
through charity. The goal of the experiment is to study the impact of guaranteed payments
on income volatility and psychological distress. The research on this experiment is undergo-
ing, however, they find that, on average, 40% of transfer is spent on food, 25% of purchases
are merchandise, and 11-12% are utilities. The Stockton Demonstration experiment should
provide good insights about the impact of unconditional transfers on the behavior and well-
being of low-income households. Also, this experiment was still undergoing in the beginning
of the COVID-19 pandemic and thus, should provide additional evidence of unconditional
cash transfers on economic shock-absorbance. However, this experiment is not sufficient to
evaluate the impact of UBI on the macroeconomic variables in the long-run because it is
7https://www.kela.fi/web/en/basic-income-experiment
8https://seed.sworps.tennessee.edu/
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low-scale (paid to only 125 residents only for 18 months) and is not financed through taxes.
Another example of UBI programs is lotteries as discussed by Marinescu (2018) because
lotteries pay unconditional income often in the form of installments of over 20 years. Cesarini
et al. (2015) and Imbens et al. (2001) analyze the behavior of lottery winners in Sweden
and Massachusetts, United States, respectively. Cesarini et al. (2015) find low response of
labor supply by lottery winners of $140,000 or more: 2 percentage points reduction in the
probability of employment. While Imbens et al. (2001) find much higher response of labor
supply by ”big winners” in contrast with ”small winners”. They find that ”big winners”
labor earnings are reduced by 11%, and the reduction is larger for individuals at age above
55.
There are other undergoing basic income pilot programs such as Chicago Resilient Fam-
ilies Task Force9 in Chicago, Illinois, Newark Guaranteed Income Task Force10 in Newark,
New Jersey, and Old Fourth Ward Economic Security Task Force11 (see more at the Stanford
Basic Income Lab12). These experiments intend to study more behavioral effects of guaran-
teed payments on saving and consumption behavior, health, and education and provide more
insights based on the size and duration of transfers. However, as in the case of Stockton’s
basic income experiment, they are not sufficient to study the effects of UBI on long-term
macroeconomic variables.
GiveDirectly13 gives cash directly to people that live in poverty. They conducted multiple
randomized controlled trial studies in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, Malawi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, United States, and Puerto Rico. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) evaluate
the effect of a very generous transfer (that equals at least twice the average monthly house-
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lages and low income households in rural Kenya. They find that after receiving unconditional
cash transfers for 9 months, the treatment group increased both non-durable consumption
and asset holdings. There investment was mainly in agriculture, animal husbandry, and en-
terprises that provide them with monthly revenues. They also find that, when transfers are
paid as lump-sum instead of monthly payments, recipients spend more on durable consump-
tion that provides evidence that households face credit constraints. Haushofer and Shapiro
(2016) suggest that the impact of transfers increases at a decreasing rate with the transfer
size. They also find that psychological well-being increases and spending on alcohol and
tobacco decreases (however, the latter is not statistically significant).
Most of the experiments cannot be used to find general equilibrium effects of cash pay-
ments because of their scale. Egger et al. (2019) analyze one of the GiveDirectly’s experiment
in rural Kenya. In this experiment, randomly selected 10,500 poor households in 653 villages
received a one-time cash transfer of $1, 000. In order to capture aggregate impacts, they ran-
domized not only cash recipients or villages, but geographic sub-locations too. Egger et al.
(2019) find that cash transfers increased sales and the fiscal multiplier was 2.5. Increased
economic activities allowed entrepreneurs to pay higher wages that had positive spillovers
to non-recipients too whose spending increased by 13%. However, there was no significant
increase in investment activities. With no supply-side response (no increase in the employ-
ment of land, labor, and capital), cash infusion should have increased inflation that was not
observed. Price level increased only by 0.1%. As authors explain, many enterprises operate
”on-demand” and before cash transfers program, utilization of factors of production were
”slack”. Egger et al. (2019) also find positive effects of cash transfers on the well-being of
both recipients and non-recipients of transfers. Findings of Egger et al. (2019) are very im-
portant, however, limited as the payments were one time. Also, even though the experiment
encompassed many villages, the cash transfers were not universal and was mainly targeted
to the poor households.
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Banerjee et al. (2019) provides more comprehensive review of basic income experiments
in the developing world and find positive effects of cash transfers on housing, sanitation,
nutrition, education, health, income, and assets.
UBI programs are also found to be useful in the case of natural disasters such as pan-
demic and hurricanes. Banerjee et al. (2020) find that basic income recipients in Kenya
showed better health outcomes, reduced hospital visits and less social interactions during
the pandemic. Also, transfer recipients following the hurricanes in 2017 in Texas and Puerto
Rico greatly value the flexibility that cash transfers allowed14.
The UBI experiments in developing countries show that UBI might be more promising in
such countries. Because borrowing constraints are much stronger in developing economies,
UBI transfers increases entrepreneurial activities (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016, Banerjee
et al. 2019). Also, unemployment rates are high in low income countries and people live
mainly close to subsistence which means that the response of their labor supply is smaller.
The limitation of the UBI experiments is that most of them have been short-term and
targeted towards the poor. However, GiveDirectly also conducts a long-term UBI experiment
in Kenya, the results of which are to be evaluated in the future.
1.2.1 Negative Income Tax as Universal Basic Income
Most of the experiments and programs that are discussed above are financed through char-
ity or dividends and have no impact on taxation. The U.S. negative income tax (NIT)
experiments are examples of cash transfer programs that provides more evidence on people’s
behavior when marginal tax rates are effected. Friedman (1962) proposed a negative income
tax system that replaces all welfare programs and in which the government guarantees a cer-
tain level of income even if an individual does not work, and every additional dollar earned
14https://www.givedirectly.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Why-Not-Cash-Lessons-from-US-Disaster-
Projects-GiveDirectly.pdf
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above this level is subject to taxation of less than 100%. As discussed by Friedman (1962),
in a regular welfare system with positive income tax rates, a marginal tax rate for a welfare
recipient equals 100%: for every dollar earned their welfare payment will be reduced by a
dollar. Thus, welfare recipients do not have incentives to work. While in the NIT system, as
the marginal tax rate on every earned dollar is less than 100%, such individuals have more
incentives to work. On the other hand, the guaranteed income in the NIT system creates an
income effect for non-recipients of welfare and thus, they might choose to work less. Because
of these potential work disincentives, NIT has never been a federal program, however, the
U.S. implemented several NIT experiments to study its effects on labor decisions and some
other outcomes such as family composition, education, and health.
Four negative income tax experiments took place in the U.S. in 1968-1980. The first NIT
experiment was the New Jersey Graduated Work Experiment in urban areas or New Jersey
and Pennsylvania in 1968-1972 with the sample size of n=1,216. Another one was the Rural
Income Maintenance Experiment in Iowa and North Carolina in 1970-1972 (n=809). The
largest and longest NIT experiment was the Seattle/Denver Income maintenance Experiment
(SIME/DIME) in 1970-1980 (n=4,800). The last one was in Gary, Indiana in 1971-1974
(n=1,799). These experiments were analyzed by many economists mainly in the context of
labor supply and family composition (Ashenfelter 1977, Moffitt 1982, Robins 1985, Burtless
1986, Munnell 1986, Cain 1986, Hum and Simpson 1993, etc).
The U.S. NIT experiments along with the Canadian Manitoba Basic Income Experiment
(in 1975-1978) are reviewed by Marinescu (2018), Widerquist (2005), and Widerquist’s blog
at Basic Income Earth Network15. On average, in response to NIT, husbands reduced their
work by 7% and wives reduced their work by 17% (Burtless 1986). Larger percentage re-
duction for wives is partially because they worked for fewer hours than husbands before the
15https://basicincome.org/news/2017/12/basic-income-guarantee-experiments-1970s-quick-summary-
results/
CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS AND THEORY 10
experiment. Workers that received higher income guarantees and for longer period reduced
their labor in a bigger magnitude. Even though NIT was found to reduce work, the reduc-
tion mainly came from the reduction of employment (extensive margin) rather than weekly
hours worked (intensive margin). Because treated workers were guaranteed by a certain level
of income, it took longer for them to find new jobs that would match them better. Addi-
tionally, misreporting of earnings to qualify for larger benefits can explain the estimated
negative effect of NIT on labor supply (Robins 1985, Burtless 1986, Ashenfelter and Plant
1990). Moreover, workers with high earnings who did not change their labor supply were
more likely to drop-out from experiment to avoid higher tax rates that NIT experiments im-
posed. This selective attrition overestimates the negative effect of NIT on working decisions
(Ashenfelter and Plant 1990). On the other hand, the NIT experiments were limited only to
workers’ responses to income tax, while such programs can be implemented through other
taxation methods (such as consumption tax) that does not increase marginal tax rates on
earnings and have less distortionary effects on employment.
Groeneveld et al. (1983) reported that the SIME/DIME experiment had an adverse effect
on marital stability. However, later, Cain (1986) criticized their finding. As Cain (1986) dis-
cusses, the experiment was not designed to identify the impact of NIT on marital stability,
there was a problem of attrition, the duration of the experiment was short, sample size for
each subgroup of the experiment was small16, and the interaction of the SIME/DIME ex-
periment with the training and counseling program, which intended to improve the earnings
potential of program participants, complicated measuring. Cain and Wissoker (1990) find
no impact of NIT on marital stability.
Maynard and Murnane (1979) find that average reading achievement increased for chil-
dren in grades 4 through 6 in Gary Indiana Experiment, while there was no significant
16There were 11 negative income tax plans: three income guarantee levels were combined with
either 50% or 70% constant marginal tax rate or 70% and 80% declining marginal tax rates.
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/overview-final-report-seattle-denver-income-maintenance-experiment
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effect of the experiment for older children. School attendance, test scores, and academic
grades were higher for children in Rural Income Maintenance Experiment too (Maynard and
Murnane 1979.
Forget (2011) finds significant improvement in health outcomes in Manitoba Basic Income
Maintenance Experiment in Canada. She finds 8.5% reduction in hospitalization rate for the
treated group and a reduction in doctor’s appointments, especially for the purposes on mental
health.
In 2017 Canada conducted the Ontario Basic Income Pilot17. 4,000 low income house-
holds received a Negative Income Tax like transfer from the government18. However, this
experiment was canceled after election of a new government in 2018. Ferdosi et al. (2020)
find significant improvement in work outcomes, also in mental and general health, decreased
use of alcohol and tobacco, and less frequent visits to emergency rooms of transfer recipi-
ents. About 25% of previously employed individuals became unemployed during the pilot,
however, 40% of them enrolled in full-time education. Also, 18% of previously unemployed
started to work, while about 25% of previously unemployed started educational or training
pursuits. The results of this experiment and potential to answer many UBI related questions
sound promising, however, Ferdosi et al. (2020) do not provide a comparison to the control
group.
Overall, the design of negative income tax experiments was largely criticized (Ashenfelter
and Plant 1990) as they do not provide an identification of labor supply effects. The impact
of NIT on health and education was not widely-studied nor the experiments were targeted
to identify such effects, however, guaranteed income seem to improve both (Maynard and
Murnane 1979, Forget 2011). Lastly, NIT was not found to have any significant effect on
marital stability (Cain and Wissoker 1990, Forget 2011). For future experiments, these issues
17https://www.ontario.ca/page/ontario-basic-income-pilot
18Singles received about $17,000 minus 50% of earned income, and couples received about $24,000 minus
50% of earned income.
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should be addressed in experiment design, consumption/saving behavior as well as fertility
should be explored, the experiments should run longer, sample size should be increased,
reporting of income and work should be controlled, and attrition should be limited. Also,
although difficult, alternative tax methods that will keep income tax unchanged should be
experimented.
1.2.2 Universal Basic Income in the COVID-19 Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse impact on low income families proved that regular
government programs are not effective. Because of lockdowns, which intended to reduce the
spread of the virus, many people, especially in low-income countries lost their income and
cannot receive unemployment insurance because such programs are not available in devel-
oping economies. As discussed by Forbes19, more than 500 political figures called for basic
income programs against the pandemic. 45 cities around the world demonstrated their sup-
port towards basic income programs in the 2020 Basic Income March20. Many governments
including the United States introduced temporary unconditional transfer programs to alle-
viate the hardship with the pandemic and quarantine. Additionally, Pope Francis endorsed
an “unconditional lump-sum payment to all citizens” in his publication Let Us Dream to
achieve more equitable post-COVID world.
In the U.S. the Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act that was signed into law by President Trump on March 27th, 2020. According
to the CARES Act, federal funds of $2 trillion was supposed to be disbursed to households
and firms through various programs. The CARES Act included one time payment of $1,200
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threshold21. On December 27 of 2020 President Trump signed another COVID-19 Relief
and spending bill that would pay $600 to every household who qualified for previous $1,200
stimulus bills.
30 Mayors of the cities in the United States created coalition of Mayors for Guaranteed
Income in order to explore and advocate UBI programs and provide funding for new pilots.
They discuss that the pandemic showed and widened the racial and gender inequality and
perceive UBI as a policy that has potential to reduce this gap.
THRIVE East of the River, responded to the COVID-19 pandemic and started a project
that paid five $1,100 monthly to 350 low income families in Wards 7 and 8 in DC, United
States22. Spain started piloting a large-scale basic income project as a response to COVID-
19 pandemic. 850,000 households will receive monthly income of e462 - e1,015. Also,
GiveDirectly provides emergency cash relief to more than 100,000 African and U.S. families
that were impacted by COVID-1923.
Thus, in the presence of adverse aggregate shocks, UBI programs gain more grounds.
1.3 Theoretical Implications
Even though multiple experiments have been conducted world-wide (Banerjee et al. 2019,
Hoynes and Rothstein 2019, Marinescu 2018, etc), there has been no long-run experiment
eliminating all other transfer programs and providing tax-financed unconditional basic trans-
fers to every resident. Thus, macroeconomic models are useful to understand the impact of
such programs. However, this literature is relatively sparse. Recently, several research have
been done in this topic mainly studying the saving, consumption, labor supply, and edu-
cational attainment behavior of households, however, the theoretical implications of UBI
21$75,000 for singles and $112,000 for those whose filing status was a head of household
22https://marthastable.org/thrive-east-of-the-river-partnership/
23https://www.givedirectly.org/covid-19/africa/
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systems on many other aspects such as entrepreneurship, fertility, and health are yet to be
studied.
Fabre et al. (2014) compare unemployment insurance (UI) and universal basic income
and find supportive evidence for the UI because costs of UBI cannot compensate for the ad-
ministrative cost of UI. They also find that the size of voluntary unemployment increases in
the UBI system. However, the utility function in their model is characterized by a counter-
factually volatile labor supply and does not allow for part-time work. While, as mentioned
above, empirical evidence of UBI programs suggests an increase in part-time employment
and no significant change of overall labor supply (Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei
2017, Jones and Marinescu 2018). Additionally, the only risk in Fabre et al. (2014) is unem-
ployment, otherwise, agents are equally productive. Therefore, UBI in Fabre et al. (2014)
does not redistribute funds toward less productive households and there is no good reason
why households would prefer UBI over UI except for the administrative costs of UI.
Van der Linden (2004) analyses a dynamic and general equilibrium model and compares
unemployment insurance and basic income system. He discusses two types of basic income
schemes: Active Citizen’s Income (ACI)24, in which individuals should be working or look-
ing for a job in order to receive a basic income from the government, and Unconditional
Income (UCI), in which everyone receives basic income. Van der Linden (2004) distinguishes
partial and full basic income schemes depending on the ratio of basic income to unemploy-
ment insurance. Basic income is financed through taxes. He finds that unemployment rate
decreases in the steady state in both ACI and UCI schemes25. However, as in Fabre et al.
(2014), reduction of unemployment rate and monitoring costs is not enough to offset the
adverse effect of higher tax rates on welfare. On the other hand, Van der Linden (2004)
finds that partial ACI is Pareto-improving. The limitation of Van der Linden (2004), as in
24As discussed by Atkinson (1995), basic income should be conditional on labor force participation
25In the UCI model unemployment rate decreases mainly because of the reduction of labor force partici-
pation.
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Fabre et al. (2014) is that the agents in his model are equally productive, they only differ in
preferences towards leisure.
Nikiforos et al. (2017) simulate the U.S economy with UBI using the Levy Institute
Keynesian Macroeconometric model for 8-year-period. They discuss 3 proposals of UBI:
$250 monthly payment to children, $500 monthly payment to adults, and $1,000 monthly
payment to adults in 4 different scenarios: whether the UBI is tax-financed or budget-deficit
financed, and whether households are treated as one aggregate sector or are allowed to
have different income/effective tax and marginal propensities to consume. The latter is a
more realistic scenario as it considers distributional differences across households. Nikiforos
et al. (2017) found that over the 8-year period output grows in contrast with the baseline
simulation and the growth rate increases with the size of UBI. After 8 years, growth is the
same as in their baseline model, however, the level of output stays permanently higher than
the output in the baseline simulation. They also find that the growth of output over the
8 years is higher when UBI is deficit-financed. Their results are appealing, however, their
work does not take into account the behavioral responses of households’ labor supply or
savings in response to the UBI. Additionally, Nikiforos et al. (2017) assume output is below
potential output and the economy is not supply-constrained. Therefore, their work is limited
to provide the long-run effects of UBI.
Hanna and Olken (2018) compare the welfare of a UBI and a targeted transfers system
with a fixed total transfer amount in both models. They discuss that in developing countries,
where many people work in the informal sector, it is hard to collect income data. Thus, in
the targeted transfers system, the government usually uses a proxy income measure based
on the information collected about the capital owned by people. Because the proxy income
might be inaccurate, this system is subject to an “exclusion error” (missing people who are
eligible for the transfer) and an “inclusion error” (giving transfers to people who do not
qualify). Thus, UBI might perform better because it guarantees that all income poor will
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receive a transfer. Hanna and Olken (2018) compare welfare in the targeted transfers system
to the UBI, based on data from Peru and Indonesia and found that the former provides
higher welfare. Since total transfers are fixed, low income individuals receive more generous
transfers in a targeted transfer program than in a UBI program. Therefore, their findings
does not provide a complete picture of UBI. In addition, Hanna and Olken (2018) discuss
only welfare implication and not other macroeconomic outcomes.
Tondani (2009) compares income tax financed Universal Basic Income systems to Nega-
tive Income Tax (NIT) and determines that these two schemes lead to an identical impact
on income distribution (when UBI is financed through an income tax). Lopez-Daneri (2016)
discusses a revenue-neutral transition of the U.S. tax/transfers system to the NIT regime,
where all current transfers are changed to a universal transfer. He finds that with a welfare
maximizing optimal NIT system GDP, the stock of capital, and the supply of labor fall,
while there is a significant gain in welfare.
Luduvice (2019) analysis UBI in a model with finite horizon and life cycle variations of
earnings. He discusses both the revenue-neutral transformation of targeted transfers system
to a UBI system and an ”Andrew Yang’s26 (AY) UBI” where every household receives a
transfer of subsistence ($12,000 annually) and UBI programs are financed by a consumption
tax. Luduvice (2019) finds that in the revenue neutral UBI system output increases and
welfare decreases, while in an AY UBI precautionary savings and therefore, output fall and
aggregate welfare as CEV increases. However, Luduvice (2019) does not consider alternative
financing methods of UBI nor the variations in UBI and targeted transfers that are useful
to find optimal transfers system and are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
Daruich and Fernandez (2020) discuss the impact of a UBI policy in the presence of
inter-generational linkages of parental education and skills and the incentives to invest in
children’s skill formation and transfer funds. Daruich and Fernandez (2020) do not explicitly
26Yang (2018) proposes a UBI system where every adult will receive $1,000 monthly.
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model targeted transfers, however they introduce progressivity of the marginal income tax
rates that accounts for the deductions and public cash transfers as in Heathcote et al. (2017).
Daruich and Fernandez (2020) find that in the same progressive income tax system (when
implicitly modelled targeted transfers are not eliminated), introduction of a UBI policy
that pays income equivalent to the poverty level reduces the long-run output by 12.9% and
welfare as CEV by up to 9% because future generations reduce savings and invest less in
their skills. When they eliminate progressivity of taxation (and thus, implicitly, targeted
transfers), which is the scenario closer to the discussion of Chapter 2, they find only 1.9%
loss of welfare as CEV. The difference in welfare outcomes in Daruich and Fernandez (2020)
and Luduvice (2019) comes from the differences in endogeneity of the labor productivity. In
Luduvice (2019), labor productivity is purely an exogenous shock and precautionary behavior
is limited to only savings, while in Daruich and Fernandez (2020) precautionary behavior
includes formation of skills too. As UBI reduces precautionary motives, it has stronger
effect on the economy in Daruich and Fernandez (2020). When they use consumption tax to
finance the UBI system (that I use in Chapter 2), aggregate welfare increases in their model
too, however, they attribute this welfare gain to the change in the tax system27 and not the
UBI.
Findings of Lopez-Daneri (2016), Luduvice (2019) and Daruich and Fernandez (2020)
are similar to mine that are discussed in Chapter 2. However, they (as well as many other
researchers) do not consider minimum consumption requirement that has implications for
savings and welfare. If people have subsistence needs, their responses of saving and labor
supply to transfers will be different. People whose total income is less than subsistence, will
not save at all and will work more to push their consumption up to the subsistence in order
to survive and gain considerably in welfare. On the other hand, if the transfer amount is not
27They discuss that, in general, if economy switches to low income tax rate and balance the budget using
higher consumption tax rate, the welfare will increase in a bigger magnitude in the system without UBI.
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guaranteed to meet the subsistence needs, people with no source of income will not survive.
Thus, agents, especially those with low income, will save and work more for precautionary
reasons. Additionally, Lopez-Daneri (2016), Luduvice (2019) and Daruich and Fernandez
(2020) do not consider partial UBI28 that does not reduce precautionary behavior as much
(discussed in Chapter 2) and also, is found to be Pareto-improving (Van der Linden 2004) as
discussed above. The implications of minimum consumption requirement as well as partial
UBI and different tax policies will be discusses in Chapter 2.
Bayer et al. (2020) discuss the economic impact and transfer multipliers of the U.S.
stimulus package (the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act) in the
COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed above, because of the pandemic, state governments closed
schools and universities (schooling changed to remote teaching) and imposed quarantine and
restrictive orders to non-essential business activities. Because of quarantine, production fell
down and many people lost their jobs. To reduce the negative economic impact, President
Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Reilef, and Economic Security (CARES) Act into law.
This stimulus package paid conditional and unconditional transfers to households to relieve
the adverse impact of the pandemic. The conditional transfer was unemployment benefit of
$600. It was paid to individuals who lost their jobs (in addition to regular unemployment
benefits). Additionally, $1,200 stimulus checks were distributed to adults whose gross income
was below $75,000. Even though these checks were conditioned on income been less than
$75,000, this concerned only a small fraction of population and thus, Bayer et al. (2020) refer
to it as ”unconditional transfers”. Bayer et al. (2020) analyze a medium-scale heterogeneous
agent New Keynesian (HANK) model that allow both, fiscal and monetary policies. In their
model, agents can either be entrepreneurs or workers who have heterogeneous productivity.
All agents can save money in the form of liquid bonds or illiquid capital and earn rent. Only
28Although they discuss revenue-neutral UBI, varying the ratio of cash transfer to subsistence requirement
will provide better insight to understand and find optimal UBI that will balance gain in welfare and loss in
output.
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randomly selected λ share of households have possibility to adjust their capital holdings in
each period. In their model, the quarantine shock reduces output by 20% without CARES
Act. While both conditional and unconditional transfers under the CARES Act reduced the
decline of output to 15%. They find that the transfers multiplier is bigger for conditional
transfers and equals 1.5, while it equals 0.25 for unconditional transfers. As they discuss,
conditional transfers reduce income risk. Also, marginal propensity to consume is higher
for conditional transfers. Therefore, it has stronger impact on the economy. Although the
HANK model discussed in Bayer et al. (2020) is more comprehensive to evaluate the impact
of the UBI systems because it includes entrepreneurs and allows monetary policy responses,
Bayer et al. (2020) discuss the impact of only one time payment of unconditional transfer
in crisis periods. Also, Bayer et al. (2020) do not discuss informal sector, while the idea
of stimulus checks was to provide funds to informal workers too who lost their jobs but
could not apply for unemployment insurance programs. Thus, their paper does not provide
sufficient answer to the impact of the UBI system on macroeconomic variables such as long-
run aggregate savings, labor, or welfare.
1.4 Universal Basic Income in the Presence of Rapid
Labor-Displacing Technical Change
Lowrey (2018), Yang (2018), Calsamiglia and Flamand (2019) and others discuss that Uni-
versal Basic Income programs are very important in the era of automation when robots are
expected to displace a lot of skills.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) use a task-based conceptual framework (Roy 1951, Zeira
1998, Acemoglu and Autor 2011, and Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018) to find that if the rental
rates are sufficiently low compared to wages in the long-run, there will not be incentives to
create new tasks and full automation is possible in the long-run. Acemoglu and Restrepo
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(2019) analyze how automation changed the labor demand by analyzing the wage bills.
They use the data for 1948-1987 and 1987-2017 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
analyse the evolution of value added and labor share in different industries. Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2019) find evidence of accelerated automation since 1987 as the creation of new
tasks slowed down and the displacement effect is stronger than the reinstatement effect.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) find similar results. They use the data about the number of
robots from the International Federation of Robotics for 1990-2007 and regress the change
in employment and wages on the exposure to robots of local labor market. Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2020) find significant and robust negative impact of robots on employment and
wages across neighbouring zones since 1990, the time when most zones exposed to robots.
Their research shows that one more robot for one thousand workers reduces the share of
employment to population by 0.18-0.34 percentage points and wages by 0.25-0.5 percent.
Autor and Salomons (2018) find that automation reduces the employment and labor’s share
of value added in the industries that are automated; and the reduction of the share of labor
is not compensated in any other industry, while the reduction of own-industry employment
is compensated by an increase in employment in customer industries.
Jaimovich et al. (2019) in their preliminary research study the aggregate and distribu-
tional effects of automation and the role of different public policies in the case of automation
in the general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. They find that as a result of
automation about two-thirds of routine-type workers, whose jobs were automated, left the
labor force and the remaining one-third are employed in non-routine manual occupations.
However, unemployment rate did not change. Jaimovich et al. (2019) find that more gener-
ous unemployment insurance programs can bring workers back to the labor force, however, as
they will compete with the workers currently in the labor force, wages will fall in non-routine
manual jobs. They consider that UBI programs as well as more progressive taxation will
be more effective to redistribute income from winners towards losers of automation, how-
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ever, UBI will come at a cost of output and welfare of the workers employed at high-wage
non-routine cognitive occupations.
In Jaimovich et al. (2019), UBI programs are financed through income taxes, while Ludu-
vice (2019) and Daruich and Fernandez (2020) find consumption tax financed UBI to be more
effective. Also, Jaimovich et al. (2019) do not consider partial UBI or combination of UBI
and targeted transfers. These, will be discussed in Chapter 3.
1.5 Conclusion
To conclude, many UBI experiments have been and are being conducted worldwide that pro-
vide us with a significant evidence about its positive impact on recipients’ consumption be-
havior, health, and well-being, however, more research is needed to understand its long-term
impacts on savings, education, and output in a larger scale tax-financed UBI environment
that does not limit eligibility of UBI transfers to low or middle income households.
As experiments are limited due to funding and time constraints, many researchers started
to study UBI in general equilibrium macroeconomic model frameworks and found its negative
effect of precautionary behavior. Such models are also useful in providing insights of the
optimal tax/transfer policies in the UBI system.
This paper suggests that the reduced precautionary savings motive and other precaution-
ary behavior should be evaluated in UBI experiments. Also, the impact of UBI on health,
education, consumption, savings, entrepreneurship, and fertility should be evaluated more
precisely. Additionally, more sophisticated macroeconomic models should be developed to
deal with the impacts of UBI on health, education, entrepreneurship, fertility, and etc.
Chapter 2
The Impact of a Universal Basic
Income System on Aggregate Capital,
Labor, Welfare, and Inequality
2.1 Introduction
In most countries, including the United States, the government pays targeted transfers usu-
ally to people with low or no income, a disability or to caregivers of disabled individuals.
These targeted transfers can take different forms such as cash assistance, food stamps, health
insurance, tax credit or tuition subsidy. However, transfers in this system may create disin-
centives in the labor market. The Universal Basic Income (UBI) system is less distortionary
because the transfer is unconditional. Therefore, it could be expected in the UBI model
that the least skilled and the asset poor will be better off because they have an opportunity
to work and earn income in addition to the transfer. Additionally, this program has many
supporters because of the increasing fear of automation or artificial intelligence, which can
22
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substitute workers and create massive unemployment1.
There are some concerns with UBI. Guaranteed income might create a wealth effect that
will induce people to, on average, work less, leading to lower output and tax revenue. How-
ever, there is little to no evidence that people reduce work when they receive unconditional
cash transfers Marinescu (2018)2. Another concern is that the government will need more
funds to finance such a system, implying an increase in distortionary taxation.
In this paper, I evaluate the impact of a universal basic income system on output and
inequality in the economy. I use an Aiyagari (1994) type heterogeneous agent model, where
agents differ in abilities and wealth and face idiosyncratic earnings risk. Individuals also have
a minimum consumption requirement3. I calibrate the model to match the key statistics of
the US economy and introduce a universal basic income scheme, where the UBI covers
the basic consumption requirement. The UBI is financed (in the baseline model) by a
consumption tax, although I explore several alternative financing schemes.
My results show that the introduction of a UBI system reduces capital by 16% and
therefore, output by 6.9%. The guaranteed payments reduce precautionary savings because
of wealth effect. Since the reduction of precautionary savings is the largest for the lowest
ability individuals, the introduction of the UBI increases wealth inequality, even while it
reduces consumption inequality. Targeted transfers recipients in a UBI system start to
work because transfers are unconditional, and thus, total hours worked increases. However,
more productive workers slightly reduce their work hours because of wealth effect of UBI
and aggregate labor supply decreases slightly (by 1.4%). Therefore, the earnings inequality
1I abstract the issue of automation in this paper. For the effects of UBI in the presence of technological
unemployment, see Jaimovich et al. (2019) and Chapter 3 of this Thesis
2Marinescu (2018) surveys results from a large number of UBI programs through the world and finds
little to no labor supply effects. These programs range from dividends to local residents (Alaska Permanent
Fund Dividend and Eastern Band Cherokees casino) to guaranteed payments through Negative Income Tax
experiments in the U.S. and Canada
3A minimum consumption requirement plays a crucial role in heterogeneous agent models because it
determines precautionary savings and is necessary to predict changes in aggregate capital and inequality.
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increases. It is important to note that these results are independent of the method of
financing the UBI, they hold even if the system is financed entirely through foreign aid.
The baseline model assumes a consumption tax, which, also reduces long run aggregate
consumption by 3.4%. However, aggregate welfare (as measured by consumption equivalent
variation, CEV) increases significantly, by 15.7%. The lower tails of the wealth distribution
benefits from the additional income they receive, while welfare of the asset rich decreases
because of high consumption tax rates.
I also show that a hybrid system with partial targeted transfers and partial UBI payments,
which covers only part of the subsistence requirement is less demanding for output and capital
accumulation and provides significant, 8.8% gain in welfare. I also show that financing this
hybrid system with a combination of capital income and consumption taxes is output and
inequality neutral, while generating significant welfare gains.
There are several caveats to my analysis. I ignore individual social welfare programs
such as social security, Medicaid and unemployment benefits and collapse them all into one
category that I call targeted programs. Second, I do not incorporate life cycle variation in
earnings4 and capital income risk that are necessary to replicate the skewness of the income
distribution (see Benhabib et al. 2015, Cagetti and De Nardi 2006, Quadrini 2000)5. Third,
even though the investment decisions on education and health are very important aspects
of the UBI, this paper excludes human capital accumulation6. Also, I do not consider the
4Luduvice (2019) estimates a richer model with life cycles and finds similar results: precautionary savings
and output fall while welfare increases with a UBI when transfers equal poverty threshold ($12,000 a year).
He also discusses revenue-neutral transformation of targeted transfers system to the UBI system. However,
Luduvice (2019) does not consider different financing methods of UBI nor alternative transfers systems with
partial UBI or Hybrid transfers that allow policy makers to implement such programs in the best way.
5The lack of life cycle variation and capital income risk do not affect the behavior of individuals in the
lowest quintiles. By underestimating top incomes, I also underestimate tax revenues and over estimate the
tax rates necessary to finance UBI. Hence including these features should strengthen my conclusions.
6Daruich and Fernandez (2020) discuss investment decisions of UBI in child’s education and find that
households invest significantly less in skills in the UBI system and thus, the welfare of future generations
fall while welfare of the first generation of UBI recipients increases. This is a very important finding that is
a result of reduced precautionary behavior of households. However, Daruich and Fernandez (2020) does not
consider the hybrid transfers system that reduces precautionary savings motives in a much smaller magnitude
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issue of automation7, which proponents of UBI argue is an important reason to provide such
programs (Calsamiglia and Flamand 2019, Lowrey 2018, Yang 2018). Despite these, this
paper is important because it sets out a framework to analyze different aspects of the UBI,
and allows us to understand its implications for the macroeconomy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 introduces a model with tar-
geted transfers system, and Section 2.3 provides a model with UBI. Section 2.4 investigates
the mechanisms of UBI to understand the results, while Section 2.5 provides robustness
analysis, and Section 2.6 concludes. In the Appendix I show how UBI affects prudence and
precautionary savings.
2.2 A Standard Model with Targeted Transfers
My model follows Aiyagari (1994) and Heer and Trede (2003) with some modifications. As
in Aiyagari (1994) and Heer and Trede (2003), in my benchmark model, I assume that
there are infinitely lived households of measure one who are heterogeneous in wealth and
face endogenous earnings shocks. Earnings risk follows first order autoregressive process.
To maximize their lifetime utility, in each period, households decide how much to work,
how much to consume and how much to save. In addition, in each period households earn
labor income and interest income on their assets. They pay income tax on their transfers,
labor and capital income, and a consumption tax on purchases. In this model, people have
minimum consumption requirement to survive and thus, the government makes sure that
everyone has sufficient income to be at the subsistence and provides transfers if necessary.
Budget is balanced in every period.
My model is different from Heer and Trede (2003) in terms of the unemployment risk.
The only risk people face is the earnings risk, and labor force participation is a choice. Some
and that potentially has interesting implications for educational investment decisions too.
7This will be addressed in Chapter 3)
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of the least skilled workers stay unemployed because they want to qualify for the transfer
payments. There is no work requirement to qualify for the transfers.
I distinguish between subsistence consumption, ỹt and subsistence income
ỹt(1+τc)
(1−τy) that
would be sufficient to cover subsistence consumption and also to pay income and consumption
taxes, τy and τc respectively (with saving=0)
8. An individual receives a transfer equal to the
difference between her income and the subsistence requirement.
2.2.1 Baseline Model
Households Problem in a Benchmark model
I assume that there are infinitely lived households of measure one with idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity risk, ei,t. To maximize their lifetime utility, in each period, households decide how
much to work li,t, how much to consume ci,t and how much assets to hold ai,t+1. In addition,
in each period, households earn labor income of wtli,tei,t (where wt is a wage rate and is
same for all households), and interest income net of depreciation (rt − δ) on their assets
ai,t. They pay income tax equal to τy on their transfers and labor income, capital income
tax τk and consumption tax τc. Households have minimum consumption requirement ỹt and
thus, government transfers guarantee a minimum income of ỹt
(1+τc)
(1−τy)
9 to be at subsistence
and provides a transfer if necessary.






βtU(ci,t − ỹt, 1− li,t) (2.1)
8For computational convenience I assume that people pay income tax on transfer payments too.
9If all income is earned through capital, then, subsistence requirement without a transfer is ỹt
(1+τc)
(1−τk) .
however, for simplicity, I ignore that difference.
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME SYSTEM 27
subject to
(1− τy)wtli,tei,t + (1 + rt − δ)ai,t − τk(rt − δ)ai,t + (1− τy)tri,t = (1 + τc)ci,t + ai,t+1 (2.2)
where
ci,t ≥ ỹt (2.3)
ỹt = γCt, (2.4)
where Ct is aggregate level of consumption,









Thus, to qualify for the transfer from the government, total labor and capital income should
be less than the subsistence requirement. The maximum transfer to an agent is the sub-
sistence requirement net of wage and interest income. Of course, if households qualify for
transfers, they will not work as they receive a utility from leisure and work will reduce the
size of transfers.
Productivity, (ei,t), follows a first order finite state Markov chain with conditional tran-
sition probabilities and is given by
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π(e′|e) = Pr(et+1 = e′|et = e) (2.7)
where
e, e′ ∈ E = {1, 2, ...n}. (2.8)
As funding of transfers programs play important role in this paper, I define an effective
policy tax rate. I define a policy tax as the tax policy that is used to balance the budget
equation. In the baseline model I use consumption tax to balance the government’s budget
constraint10. Thus, an effective policy tax rate in the baseline model is calculated as a
percentage of consumption taxes net of transfers in consumption. Thus, an effective policy
tax rate, τ ∗i,t, is defined as
τ ∗i,t =
τcci,t − (1− τy)tri,t
ci,t
. (2.9)
The effective consumption tax rate will be negative when transfers received are greater
then the consumption tax paid. In the baseline model with targeted transfers, the effective
tax rate for transfer recipients with no wealth is -100% as they consume at the minimum.
While equals consumption tax rate for non-recipients of transfers.
Firms
There is a representative firm that employs labor Lt and capital Kt to produce output Yt to
maximize profit, using the constant returns to scale production technology





Setting the price of final goods to unity, the profit maximization problem for the firm is
10In Section 2.4.1, I discuss alternative tax policies too.






t − wtLt − rtKt (2.11)
Government
The government follows a balanced budget every period. They earn revenue from the tax on
transfers, labor, capital, and consumption. Outlays consist of government spending Gt and
total transfer payments to households TRt. Government spending Gt is a constant µ share





Thus, in each period the budget constraint for the government in the benchmark model will
be ∫ ∞
0





Gt = µYt (2.14)
The budget is balanced by varying the consumption tax rate, while labor and capital
income tax rates are fixed11.
Value Function
The households problem can be written in recursive form as:
v(ai,t, ei,t) = max
ci,t,li,t




11As I show in later sections, consumption tax financing causes less distortions to the economy.
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subject to the budget constraint in Equation (2.2).
Preferences
I use the separable preferences with the following period utility function:







As discussed in Castaneda et al. (1998) and Heer and Trede (2003), the above utility
function is more in accordance with empirical observations than Cobb-Douglas functional
form of utility because it predicts variability in hours worked more accurately.
Market Clearing
For a given government tax policy and a constant distribution F (e, a) with associated density
f(e, a) over the individual state space (e, a) ∈ E × [0,∞), the stationary equilibrium in
the baseline system with targeted transfers is characterized by the value functions v(e, a),
decisions rules c(e, a), l(e, a), a′(e, a) for consumption, labor supply, and next-period assets,
respectively, time-invariant relative factor prices w, r, effective policy tax rates τ ∗(e, a), the
average effective policy tax rate τ ∗, total transfers (TR), aggregate capital (K), aggregate
labor (L), government spending (G) such that:
i) The value function and decision rules solve agents’ utility maximization problem.
ii) Factor prices solve the firm’s profit maximization problem and equal to marginal
product of each factor.
rt = Fk(K,L) = αK
−(1−α)L1−α (2.17)
w = FL(K,L) = (1− α)KαL−α (2.18)


























τ ∗(e, a)f(e, a)da = τ ∗ (2.23)
C +K ′ +G = F (K,L) + (1− δ)K (2.24)
iv) Budget is balanced:
τy(1− α)KαL(1−α) + τk(αKαL1−α − δK) + τyTR + τcC = TR +G (2.25)
v) The distribution of the individual state variables is constant:
F (e′, k′) =
∑
e∈E
π(e′|e)F (e, k) (2.26)
for all k′ ∈ [0,∞) and e′ ∈ E and with k′ = k′(e, k).
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2.2.2 Calibration
Most of the calibrated parameters are as suggested by Heer and Trede (2003). The choice for
the parameters of discount rate, relative risk aversion, and subsistence consumption comes
from Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz (2005), who include minimum consumption requirement in
the utility function. As they discuss, the minimum consumption is equal to the 28% of
average consumption and the parameters of relative risk aversion and discount rate should
be equal to 1.8 and 0.9546, respectively. As presented in Table 2.1, federal poverty level
is very close to the 28% of average consumption, and it justifies once more, my choice of
minimum consumption parameter.
I set the income tax rate, τy, to equal 0.25, capital income tax rate, τk to be 0.15, and
the consumption tax rate, τc to balance the government budget constraint. The model
parameters are given in Table 2.2.
As in De Nardi (2004), logarithm of income follows an AR(1) process with persistence
parameter to be equal to 0.95 and variance of earnings to be the Gini coefficient of earnings
0.38. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) approximate the income process (normalized to 1) with
a five state Markov chain. Thus,
e = (0.2468, 0.4473, 0.7654, 1.3097, 2.3742) (2.27)
The annual transition matrix of productivities is also based on Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006):
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
0.7376 0.2473 0.0150 0.0002 0.0000
0.1947 0.5555 0.2328 0.0169 0.0001
0.0113 0.2221 0.5333 0.2221 0.0113
0.0001 0.0169 0.2328 0.5555 0.1947
0.0000 0.0002 0.0150 0.2473 0.7376

2.2.3 Results
My benchmark model simulates the distribution of wealth quite accurately except for the top
percentiles. As De Nardi (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Benhabib and Bisin (2016),
and others claim, in order to match the distribution of wealth in the top tails, in addition
to earnings risk, we need to include life-cycle variation in earnings, a bequest motive, and
capital income risk. Although it is important to match distributions accurately, in order to
better understand and disentangle the impact of a UBI, I keep the model simple and include
only idiosyncratic earnings risk. Thus, the inequality measures such as wealth, earnings,
income and consumption are much smaller than suggested by the data (Rios-Rull and Kuhn
2016, Krueger and Perri 2001). However, as we can observe from Table 2.3, the behavior of
the income poor, transfers and the poverty rate are quite well-explained by the benchmark
model. The poverty rate in the US in 2018 was 13.112, and my model predicts 15.3%.
The share of total transfers in aggregate output is also close to the data13: 3.6% of the
nominal GDP goes to all welfare programs including SNAP and Medicaid (excluding social
security because agents in my model are infinitely lived). Labor force participation rate is
also accurately matched. 84.7% of working age population are predicted to work, while in
the data, labor force participation rate is 83.1%14.
12https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/saipe//?mapgeoSelector = aac
13http://federalsafetynet.com/welfare-budget.html
14U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Participation Rate - 25-54 Yrs.(January,
2020) [LNS11300060], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
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As expected, people with lowest level of productivity and low wealth do not work because
their earnings would be less than subsistence requirement and they qualify for the transfer
anyway. Recall that in this model the transfer is equal to the difference between subsistence
and earnings. People receive utility from leisure and thus, those who qualify for the transfer,
prefer not to work because their total income will be at subsistence anyway. This is also
confirmed by the data. The mean value of total income (the sum of labor earnings, interest
or other business income, and transfers) of recipients of welfare - $12,186 (IPUMS Data:
2011, 2012, 2013 15) is around the poverty threshold - $12,060.
Interestingly, the least productive people with zero wealth (0.3% of households or 1 mil-
lion people for the U.S.), work so much (50-55% of their time) that they earn slightly above
subsistence and thus, do not qualify for the transfers. They do so in order to push their con-
sumption slightly above the subsistence requirement and increase their utility significantly.
On the other hand, households with some low level of wealth can reduce their wealth in
order to consume slightly above the subsistence and therefore, rely on transfers. Thus, the
targeted transfers system do not really achieve its goal and do not help the asset poorest
(This issue will be addressed again in Section 2.3.3, Figure 2.3).
2.3 Baseline Model with Universal Transfers
I consider a UBI model that is financed by a balanced budget. My UBI model is not revenue
neutral. Because everyone receives a universal basic transfer, the government needs to finance
such a system, and thus, with the UBI, both, revenue and costs of the government rise. At
the same time, there is no other targeted transfer in the model because the UBI system
substitutes all the safety net programs. The framework of the basic model is provided in the
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNS11300060, April 28, 2020.
15Steven Ruggles, Sarah Flood, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, Erin Meyer, Jose Pacas,
and Matthew Sobek. IPUMS USA: Version 9.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V9.0




The set up of the model is the same as in the previous model with the difference that everyone
receives the benefit of ỹt
(1+τc)
(1−τy) . The transfer is supposed to be sufficient to survive without
any labor or capital income.




) = (1+τc)ci,t+ai,t+1 (2.28)
where
ai,t ≥ 0 (2.29)
and
ct ≥ max{ỹBench, 28%CUBI} (2.30)
Where CUBI is average consumption in the stationary equilibrium, and e is again a pro-
ductivity process that follows a first order finite state Markov chain with conditional tran-
sition probabilities given by Equations (2.7) and (2.8). ỹBench is the minimum consumption
requirement in the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model with targeted transfers.
With this condition, the minimum consumption in the UBI system is at least the minimum
consumption in the benchmark model with targeted transfers because standards of living is
not likely to decrease if economy transits to a UBI system.
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An effective policy/consumption tax rate, τ ∗, is calculated as
τ ∗i,t =
τcci,t − ỹt(1 + τc)
ci,t
. (2.31)
For asset poor households whose consumption is closer to the minimum consumption
requirement, the effective consumption tax rate will be negative, while it will be positive for
wealthier households who consume more and thus, pay high consumption taxes.
Firms
The firm’s problem is the same as in the benchmark model.
Government
The government follows a balanced budget every period. They earn revenue from income tax
on labor, capital, and transfers as well as from consumption tax. Government outlays consist
of transfers TRt to households that is equal to the subsistence income, and government






Thus, in each period the budget constraint for the government with UBI would be
∫ ∞
0
(τywtli,tei,t + τk(rt − δ)ai,t + τyỹt
(1 + τc)
(1− τy)




where Gt is defined as in Equation (2.14) and, again, the consumption tax rate is used to
balance the budget.
Preferences, value functions and the market equilibrium conditions are all similar to the
benchmark model with transfers.
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Calibration
Calibration parameters are the same as in the benchmark model. Income tax rates are fixed
and the consumption tax rate is calibrated to balance the budget constraint. In Section 2.4.1
I relax this assumption to study the effects of alternative models of financing UBI.
2.3.2 Welfare
In the stationary equilibrium, welfare gain from a UBI system for a household i with asset
level of ai and productivity ei is denoted by ηi and shows the percentage of consumption
required to equalize the value function in the benchmark system to the value function in
the UBI system for the same level of assets and productivity. Thus, I calculate welfare gain
for each household as Consumption Equivalent Variation (CEV) and then, I calculate an
average welfare gain for the distribution of households in the benchmark model.
I follow the methodology described in Mukoyama (2011) and Jones and Pratap (2020),
add the minimum consumption requirement and calculate a welfare gain, ηi as:




To find ηi, I first find an asset equivalent aj (Jones and Pratap (2020)) so that




Then, I take corresponding consumption, caj ,ei from the decision rules and calculate
ηi =
caj ,ei − cai,ei
cai,ei
. (2.36)
Average welfare gain η is then calculated as








where f bench is the distribution function in the benchmark economy with targeted trans-
fers.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the UBI model in comparison to the benchmark model.
The benchmark model outcomes are normalized to 100. The third column presents results
for the UBI model in comparison to the benchmark model. As we see, under the UBI system,
aggregate capital falls by 16%. This happens because guaranteed payments create the wealth
effect that reduces the prudence of households and therefore, precautionary savings16. As
aggregate capital falls, output falls too by 6.9%. Because now everyone receives a subsistence
transfer, the required transfer amount equals to 33.7% of the output. UBI system is financed
by a consumption tax rate of 43.1%. Because of a raise in the tax rate and a decrease in
output, aggregate consumption falls by 3.4%.
Even though consumption tax rate in the UBI system is very high, the effective con-
sumption tax rate that is consumption tax net of transfers17 does not increase as much. It
even decreases for asset poorer and low income households who consume less and thus, pay
low consumption taxes and who could not qualify for transfers in the baseline system with
targeted transfers. The average effective policy/consumption tax rate18 decreases from -0.3%
to -2.1%19. Thus, financing such a system is not as a big challenge as it seems. The effective
policy tax rate decreases for the asset poor households and increases for the asset rich. Over-
16A detailed description of the effect UBI on precautionary savings can be found in Appendix.
17The effective tax rate for the benchmark system with targeted transfers and for the UBI system is defined
in Equation (2.9) and Equation (2.31) respectively.
18The average effective tax rate is defined in Equation (2.31)
19Low effective consumption tax rate is not necessarily good. Partially, it indicates the existence of many
low income households who cannot afford high levels of consumption.
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all, the effective consumption tax rate decreases for 42% of households. The lowest effective
policy/consumption tax rate in the UBI system is -47% and highest is 24%. Effective policy
tax rates in the UBI system for different level of wealth and productivity is given in Figure
2.1.
The UBI system causes the inequality of wealth to expand by 4.5 percentage points and
the Gini index of wealth inequality becomes 0.447. The wealth distribution is shown in
Figure 2.2. Because the least skilled and asset poor reduce their precautionary savings more
as discussed in Appendix, the inequality of wealth increases.
Table 2.5 shows the distribution of wealth for different wealth quintiles. Neither bench-
mark nor UBI models fit the data on the top percentiles, however, this should not be a
concern for my analysis. As Quadrini (2000), De Nardi (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006),
Benhabib et al. (2015) and others have suggested, in order to get more accurate distribution
of the top tail of the wealth, we need a richer model with finite horizon, bequest motives
and capital income risk. As the wealth effect created by a UBI policy is stronger for the
least skilled and asset poorer households, this simple model should be sufficient to explain
the mechanisms of UBI.
The mean values of assets and corresponding standard deviations for each type of pro-
ductivity is given in Table 2.6. With UBI all agents in each productivity type save less,
on average, but standard deviations slightly fall. Also, as shown in Table 2.6, under the
UBI system less productive people reduce their asset holding more than productive people
(recall that agents are ex ante heterogeneous in wealth too for each type of productivity).
This is because UBI payments affect permanent income as well as absolute prudence of less
productive people more.
Even though inequality of wealth increase with the UBI system, Gini indices of income
(the sum of labor earnings, interest income, and transfers) and consumption are reduced by
6.1 and 3.5 percentage points respectively. With the UBI system, the least skilled and asset
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poor have an opportunity to earn above the subsistence transfers by working (while in the
targeted transfers system, they could not consume above the subsistence without working
extensive hours that would disqualify them from transfers). Thus, the inequality of total
income falls with the UBI system. Similarly, because of higher income, the least skilled and
asset poor have access to higher levels of consumption and the inequality of consumption
falls too.
With the UBI system the labor force participation rate increases to 100%. The former
recipients of targeted transfers start to supply labor and total hours worked increases, while
more skilled labor slightly reduce hours worked because of the wealth effect. Therefore,
aggregate labor is almost unaffected (reduced by 1.4%) as the empirical literature on the
UBI experiments suggests20. As total hours worked increases mainly because of the least
skilled workers, and aggregate labor is almost unaffected in the UBI model, the inequality
of labor earnings expands by around 1.2 percentage points.
Labor supply decisions for agents with different levels of wealth and productivities are
shown in Figure 2.3. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, in the benchmark model with targeted
transfers the least skilled and the asset poorest workers (with zero wealth) work more than
50% of hours available to consume above the subsistence requirement that automatically
disqualifies them from the transfer, while the least skilled workers with low positive level of
wealth prefer not to work and receive the transfer from the government (15.3% of households).
Thus, the benchmark model does not quite achieve its goals to support the income poor
households. The labor supply decision rules for the households with the productivity type 1
in Figure 2.3 make it clear that some small positive level of wealth creates incentives for the
less productive workers not to work and receive a transfer in the benchmark model, while
they would work with the UBI transfers system. While the distortions of the labor supply
20As discussed in Marinescu (2018), Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2017), Kangas et al. (2019),
labor supply does not reduce, while part-time employment increases.
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for the least skilled workers (Productivity Type 1) caused by targeted transfers system are
noticeable in Figure 2.3, with the UBI model, the decision rules are smooth because the
transfer is unconditional.
In the UBI system, consumption is higher for the asset poorer, while it is lower for
the wealthier than in the benchmark system (Figure 2.4). The welfare gains as CEV on
Figure 2.5 make it clear that the asset poor and the least productive households benefit
significantly with the UBI system. While the utility of the asset high households is barely
affected. Additionally, as the distribution of wealth is skewed to the right, the aggregate
welfare measured a CEV increases significantly, by 15.7%.
2.4 Model Mechanisms
In order to understand why aggregate capital and consumption falls in the economy with a
UBI, I now evaluate different models with alternative financing methods of UBI.
2.4.1 Alternative Financing of UBI
Foreign Aid Financing
First, I want to investigate if a higher consumption tax rate is the reason why people save
less because with a high consumption tax, they have to spend more on the same basket of
goods. To address this, I assume that the UBI system is fully financed by a foreign aid, so
that there is no issue with financing.
With foreign-aid financed UBI, households and firms problems are same, only the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint changes. For computational convenience, they do not receive
the income tax from the UBI and they give no transfer. Thus, the budget constraint is the
following:




τytntei + τk(rt − δ)at + τcct
)
da = Gt (2.38)
As Table 2.7 summarizes, all macroeconomic variables change by the same direction as
in the consumption tax-financed UBI model with the exception of the consumption and con-
sumption tax rate. Because UBI is financed by foreign aid, aggregate consumption increases.
Because of no targeted transfers and higher tax base, consumption tax rate is actually lower
than in the benchmark system with targeted transfers. As a result, the welfare gain as
CEV is 51.1%. However, even if there is no financing issue, under the UBI system, savings
fall anyway by 19.3% due to the elimination of precautionary savings motive. Thus, this
model shows that the availability of funds is not a main determinant of the model outcomes
presented in the previous section.
Income-Tax Financing
In this subsection, capital income tax rate is fixed at 15% and the consumption tax rate
is fixed at 5.6%, the consumption tax rate needed to balance the budget in the benchmark
model. I use the labor income tax to balance the budget in the UBI model. This model
is similar to Negative Income Tax (NIT). An effective policy tax rate for this subsection is
calculated as
τ ∗i,t =
τywtli,tei,t − (1 + τc)ỹt
wtli,tei,t
(2.39)






τ ∗(e, a)f(e, a)da, (2.40)
where f(e, a) is a density associated with the distribution function in the income-tax
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financed UBI system.
Results are given in Table 2.8. With the proportional income tax, to finance transfers in
the UBI system, income tax rate doubles and reaches 51.8%. However, the average effective
policy/income tax rate is -8%. As marginal income is subject to higher income tax, marginal
product of labor falls and as a result, the supply of labor falls in a bigger magnitude, by 2.6%
and hours worked increases in slightly lower magnitude, by 6.7%. However, aggregate capital
falls in a bigger magnitude, by 26.7% because on average, the effective income tax rate is
very low that creates wealth effect and relaxes precautionary savings motives. As a result,
output and consumption fall too by 12.5% and 6.8% respectively. Welfare, as measured by
CEV increases and equals 19%.
Progressive Income Tax
The U.S income tax system is progressive, thus we might need to test how UBI will work
with a progressive income tax system. Here, again I use consumption tax rate to balance
the budget. The progressive income tax brackets in this model imitate and simplify the U.S
progressive tax brackets21. Progressive tax is determined as:
τy =

0 if wtli,tei,t + (rt − δ)ai,t ≤ ỹt(1+τc)(1−τy)
0.15 if ỹt(1+τc)
(1−τy) ≤ wtli,tei,t + (rt − δ)ai,t ≤ Ct
0.25 if Ct ≤ wtli,tei,t + (rt − δ)ai,t ≤ 4Ct
0.35 if wtli,tei,t + (rt − δ)ai,t > 4Ct
(2.41)
where Ct is average consumption.
Column 4 of Table 2.8 presents results that compares to the benchmark model with
progressive taxation. Now, with a progressive taxation, a lower consumption tax rate, 34.5%,
21https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/taxbracket.asp
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is required to finance the UBI system. The aggregate level of capital drops by 17.3% while the
aggregate supply of labor is decreases by 2.9%. In the benchmark model with progressive
taxation no one qualifies for targeted transfers. As income tax rate for low income is 0,
households have stronger incentive to work and thus, do not qualify for transfers in the
benchmark model. Therefore, when UBI system is introduced, the wealth effect of UBI
applies to the least skilled workers too and thus, total hours worked decreases by 5.3%.
For the same reason, the inequality of labor income increases by a smaller magnitude, by
1.2 percentage points. However, the inequality of wealth rises by a bigger magnitude of
7.6 percentage points with the progressive taxation (compared to a benchmark model with
progressive tax). As with the progressive tax, the income and consumption inequalities
are lower in the benchmark model, they reduce by smaller magnitudes, by 3.6 and 2.1
percentage points, in the UBI system with progressive tax. The welfare gain, measured as
CEV is positive and equals 7.5%.
Low Capital Income Tax
As one of the main flaws of the UBI system is a reduction of precautionary savings, gov-
ernments should encourage savings by other means when implementing such programs. One
potential tool for this could be reducing capital income tax. For this subsection, I assume
lower, 5% capital income tax rate (τk) in the UBI system, while labor income tax rate is
maintained at 25%.
The results of such financing are in the last column of Table 2.8. Now, aggregate capital
does not fall as much. In contrast with the benchmark model with 15% capital income
tax, aggregate capital falls by only 11%. Therefore, a reduction in the aggregate output is
smaller too, 5.1%, and the wealth Gini increases by 4.4 percentage points, by almost the
same magnitude as in the UBI model with 15% capital income tax. Consumption inequality
is still reduced effectively by 3.4%, and welfare increases by 15.9% as CEV. However, as
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capital income tax rate is lower, consumption tax rate has to be higher and equals 45.7%.
2.4.2 Alternative Transfer Schemes
Variations in Transfers in the UBI Model
Now, I want to discuss the impact of different universal transfer amounts on macroeconomic
outcomes. What if we give people smaller universal transfer so that less funding is needed
to finance the UBI system and also, people have a stronger need for precautionary savings?
On the other hand, one might argue that, in order to reduce poverty, when income is less
than subsistence, we should give people transfer above the subsistence so that they have a
chance to save for inter-temporal motive and accumulate wealth. One might also want to
discuss the model with no transfer and see how a UBI system performs in comparison.
Thus, here, again, the budget constraint of households is:
(1− τy)wtli,tei,t + (1 + rt − δ)ai,t − τk(r − δ)ai,t + sỹt(1 + τc) = (1 + τc)ci,t + ai,t+1 (2.42)
where
ci,t ≥ ỹt, (2.43)
and
ai,t ≥ 0 (2.44)
and s varies with the policy.
Because UBI payments change lifetime earnings and, as a response, households reduce
precautionary savings, savings decrease in s. However, because we compare our analysis to
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the benchmark model with means-tested transfer of subsistence, an interesting special case
to consider is when s < 1, that is when UBI payments do not guarantee subsistence. For
s < 1, in the worst realization of the productivity shock, households with low levels of wealth
will need to work harder to survive because there are no targeted transfers. This increases
their absolute prudence that induces precautionary savings as well as labor supply to rise
for the least skilled and asset poor.
I vary s from 0 to 1.3 with an increments of 0.1. Output is decreasing in s (Figure 2.6,
Panel (a)). However, for low s, (from 0 to 0.3) output is higher than in the benchmark
model because of higher precautionary savings and s = 0.4 would constitute to the same
level of output as in the benchmark model. For s=0.4 (or about UBI of $4,800 per adult
per year), the change in welfare gain measured as CEV is 7%. The change in welfare for
different annual UBI payments is given in Figure 2.6: Panel (b). With the UBI system the
welfare is always higher than in the benchmark system, however, it increases faster with s
for s < 0.60, or 60% of the subsistence requirement (or about UBI of $7,200 per adult per
year). s > 1 does not encourage savings and the output continues to fall22. The inequality
of consumption is lower than in the benchmark model for any s and it decreases with s (for
the range of s=0, ..., 1.3).
Combination of a Targeted Transfers and UBI Schemes
As both benchmark and UBI transfers systems have advantages and disadvantages, a com-
bination of the two transfers schemes might be beneficial. UBI is effective at reducing the
inequality of consumption, however, requires significant increases in tax rates and reduces
the precautionary savings motives. As discussed above, partial UBI is more effective than
full UBI because it creates smaller wealth effect and is cheaper. While more generous tar-
geted transfers system would provide a significant gain in welfare, it does not reduce the
22Allowing entrepreneurship in the model might change this result
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inequality of consumption and is demanding for output. Thus, I want to discuss a hybrid
model where every household will receive a partial UBI payment from the government, and
eligible households will receive targeted transfers in addition to UBI. More precisely, in the










Figure 2.7 shows output (Panel (a)) and a change in welfare measured as CEV (Panel
(b)) for the hybrid model with different UBI payments. Hybrid model shows an interesting
pattern of output for different h. For low h, or when UBI is below 30% of subsistence
requirement, output falls in contrast with the benchmark model and welfare gain is small.
This is the range where UBI is too low to change the behavior of the least skilled poor. Thus,
they do not work and still qualify for the targeted transfers too. However, at 40% of UBI,
the need for targeted transfers is eliminated and every household earns above the eligibility
threshold ((1-h) share of subsistence requirement). Thus, the supply of labor increases and
for h=0.4 output is at the benchmark level. However, for UBI higher than 40%, output
gradually decreases because higher transfers reduce precautionary savings and the effect of
a fall of capital outweighs the effect of an increase of labor supply.
If the hybrid model is implemented by reducing capital income tax rate to 5%, output
is at the benchmark model level for h=0.5. I provide outcomes for partial UBI and Hybrid
models with unconditional transfers equal to 50% of subsistence requirement in Table 2.9.
I call the first one a 50% partial-UBI model, and the other - 50% Hybrid model. For both,
50% partial-UBI and 50% Hybrid models, a fall in aggregate capital, and therefore output is
smaller because precautionary savings do not drop as much. Required consumption tax rate
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to finance such systems is also within a reasonable range 18-22% and welfare gain as CEV
is significant, between 8-9%. The 50% Hybrid model with 5% capital income tax rate works
best because aggregate capital, output, and consumption as well as the wealth gini index are
almost unaffected, while welfare gain is significant, 7.9% as CEV. Consumption inequality
decreases and the aggregate welfare as well as the welfare of the least skilled and asset poor
as CEV improve. The average effective policy/consumption tax rate is 2.8%, and the highest
effective consumption tax rate is 14%. Effective consumption tax rates for different levels of
wealth and productivity is in Figure 2.8.
2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Natural Borrowing Limit
It is interesting to check how a UBI system would work with complete markets. As Aiyagari
(1994) discusses, when borrowing is allowed, people save less for precautionary reasons be-
cause borrowing allows them to smooth consumption when bad shocks occur. As in Aiyagari
(1994), I will now assume that the borrowing limit is at the natural level so that households
are guaranteed to consume at the minimum consumption requirement given the worst real-
ization of the future productivity shocks (no default allowed).
ai,t ≥ −
(1− τy)wte1,t − (1 + τc)ỹt
(r − δ)
(2.46)
As there are no entrepreneurs in this model, the debt is mainly held by the least skilled
and asset poorest workers. Borrowers have to earn enough to repay their debt, interest and
consume at the subsistence. Thus, they cannot rely on the government transfer because it
does not cover all their needs: the maximum transfer amount is equal to the subsistence
requirement and does not cover interest payments. Thus, households with high debt levels
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will need to give up on transfers and work to cover all their needs.
To show this, let us denote debt by di,t. Then, if a debt holder qualifies for the transfer,
the budget constraint is:








This is same as:
(1 + rt − δ)di,t ≤ di,t+1 (2.48)
Thus, if debt holders qualify for transfers, the only way to repay the debt and interest
is to take a new, higher level of debt. This violates the No Ponzi game condition.Thus,
these households need to work to earn enough to repay debt and consume at the minimum
consumption requirement. And, by earning above subsistence, households do not qualify for
transfers. Thus, the natural borrowing limit for transfer recipients equals zero in the baseline
system.
As transfer recipients are the least skilled and asset poorest households, relaxing borrow-
ing constraints do not change results in the baseline system as there is no borrowing in the
stationary equilibrium for the given utility function23.
In the UBI system, as guaranteed income increases in every period, minimum income
increases too and thus, borrowing limit increases. Thus, UBI cancels the minimum con-
sumption requirement in Equation (2.46) and the borrowing limit becomes24
23For other types of utility functions, such as Cobb-Douglas type utility function, there is borrowing in the
baseline system. Borrowers are the least productive and asset poorest workers who do not receive transfers
and work almost all their time to repay their debts.
24The results with the same borrowing limit as in Equation (2.46) predicts similar results for our utility
function.





The results of a UBI model with borrowing in contrast to a benchmark model are in the
last two columns of Table 2.10. With or without borrowing, the direction of the changes
are, mainly, similar. However, because borrowing is allowed, capital drops more with the
UBI system than it does with incomplete markets. In the UBI system aggregate capital falls
with or without borrowing because of less precautionary needs; however, with no borrowing,
aggregate capital falls by around 16%, while with natural borrowing limit it drops by 22.6%.
These results are in line with the discussion by Aiyagari (1994): with no borrowing agents
will need more precautionary savings and thus, under a UBI system they reduce savings by a
lower magnitude than with natural borrowing limit. The inequality of wealth is much higher
too in the UBI model with borrowing. The UBI model with borrowing predicts the wealth
Gini coefficient to increase by almost 20 percentage points. Even though aggregate capital
falls in a bigger magnitude With borrowing allowed, the UBI model predicts 18.3% gain in
welfare.
2.5.2 Changes in Minimum Consumption Requirement
Minimum Consumption Requirement in Benchmark Model
Researchers often ignore the minimum consumption requirement. When the interest is to
analyze the high-end wealth, then, the role of minimum consumption requirement might be
negligible because it is not a constraint for the asset rich. However, when we analyze public
policies with transfers, and our target is to analyze the welfare and the poverty, positive
minimum consumption requirement is crucial because it affects decision-making of the least
productive and asset poor. To see that it is really the case, I now analyze the models with
zero minimum consumption requirement. For robustness, I also consider the economy with
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higher minimum consumption requirement. In the model with no minimum consumption
requirement, eligibility threshold for targeted transfers is again 28% of average consump-
tion adjusted with taxes. In the model with higher consumption requirement, minimum
consumption equals 40% of the average consumption and eligibility threshold to qualify for
transfers equals subsistence requirement (40% of average consumption adjusted with tax
rates). Thus, first,








The outcomes of the benchmark model with higher and zero subsistence requirement is
given in Table 2.11. Because there is no minimum consumption requirement for survival,
there is less need for precautionary savings and thus, in the model with zero minimum
consumption requirement aggregate capital as well as aggregate labor are much smaller than
in the models with this requirement. Welfare is much higher with zero minimum consumption
model because any positive level of consumption contributes to the utility significantly. Thus,
aggregate capital, labor, and output are higher, and welfare is lower in the models with higher
minimum consumption requirement.
It is important to note that analyzing the model with zero minimum consumption re-
quirement would lead to almost 10 percentage points higher wealth inequality and we might
misinterpret it as a success of the model in explaining the inequality. This happens because
precautionary savings motives are much lower with zero minimum consumption requirement
and it is more likely that the asset poor stay poor in the model. However, as in real life
people do have positive minimum consumption requirement, the models with zero minimum
consumption requirement intrinsically generate higher wealth Gini coefficient that should
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not be attributed to the success of the model.
UBI and Minimum Consumption Requirement
Now, I want to check how UBI would perform in economies with higher or with no minimum
consumption requirement. Results are in Table 2.12. For comparison, the outcomes of the
benchmark models of high and zero minimum consumption requirements are normalized to
100s. The results, again, emphasize the importance of minimum consumption requirement
in heterogeneous agents macroeconomic models. By not including minimum consumption
requirement, the UBI model (with no borrowing) predicts only 8.4% drop in aggregate
capital, only by 0.001 percentage point increase in the inequality of wealth, and higher, 17%
gain in welfare as CEV. As precautionary saving motives are weaker with zero minimum
consumption requirement in the benchmark system, a fall in precautionary savings is lower
too in the UBI system. Alternatively, with higher, 40% minimum consumption requirement,
aggregate capital falls more (by 18.5%) and the inequality of wealth increases more, by 6.3
percentage points; the welfare gain is about the same (15.1%).
2.5.3 GHH Preferences
As one of the main concerns for a UBI program is its wealth effect on the supply of labor,
it is interesting to find out how a UBI would work for a utility function where labor sup-
ply decisions depends only on wages and not on the level of wealth. For this I use GHH
preferences (Greenwood et al. 1988) that takes the following form:
u(ci,t − ỹt, li,t) =






λ = 5 as in Heer and Maussner (2008) and θ is calibrated so that a stationary fraction
of working hours equals 0.33 as people usually work 1
3
of their time.
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Results are in the second and third columns of Table 2.13. With no wealth effect of
labor, in overall, households slightly reduce their work because wage rate falls by 9.7%.
However, the supply of unskilled labor increases significantly because households that used
to receive targeted transfers start to work. Total hours worked increases in a bigger magni-
tude than with the benchmark utility function in Equation (2.16) and therefore, aggregate
labor increases too. Because of a rise in low skilled labor, the earnings inequality increases
significantly, by 5.6 percentage points.
On the other hand, the aggregate capital drops in a bigger magnitude (by 23.6%) than
with the utility function that exhibits the wealth effect. This happens because households
in the benchmark system with no wealth effect of labor supply do not increase work if bad
shock occurs (because labor supply depends only on the wage rate), and thus, need higher
precautionary savings. Therefore, the impact of a UBI system on precautionary savings
is stronger. While an option to supply more labor in bad times reduces prudence in the
benchmark model with wealth effect of labor supply. Therefore, a change in prudence is
smaller with the UBI system in such economy.
Another main difference is that the inequality of wealth increases in a smaller magnitude,
by 2.3 percentage points, while income inequality and consumption inequalities decrease in a
bigger magnitudes, by 11.2 and 6.3 percentage points respectively. Welfare as CEV increases
in a bigger magnitude by 25.6%.
2.5.4 Small Open Economy
Now, I evaluate the impact of a UBI program for a small open economy so that the interest
rate is exogenous. I fix the interest rate at 7%. Results are in 4th and 5th column of Table
2.13. Though preferences are again the same as in Equation (2.16) and exhibit wealth
effect, aggregate labor supply increases by 4.8%. However, aggregate capital falls in a bigger
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magnitude, by 43.2%, because interest rates do not adjust when precautionary savings fall25.
As in a small open economy capital and output fall drastically, aggregate welfare falls by
7.5%.
2.6 Conclusion
The impact of a permanent Universal Basic Income program is more complicated than
expected: while the concerns regarding UBI is not limited to funding of such a program, it
is not unrealistic. With a proper administration, a UBI system can provide a huge gain in
welfare without compromising output.
I discussed the UBI system where every individual receives a transfer of subsistence and
targeted transfers system is eliminated. In such a system aggregate capital and output
fall, and the inequality of wealth and labor earnings increases regardless of the financing
method of the program: even if it is financed entirely through the foreign aid. However, a
UBI system reduces inequalities of total income and consumption. The aggregate welfare,
measured as consumption equivalent variation increases by 15.7% in the UBI system. A
welfare gain is larger for the less productive and asset poorer people. To finance the UBI
system, government needs resources and requires significant increases in the tax rates. As a
result, aggregate consumption falls by 3.4%.
With the UBI system the level of aggregate capital falls because guaranteed payments
reduce precautionary savings motive. Because precautionary savings are more relevant for
the least productive and asset poor, the savings of the asset poor decrease more and thus, the
inequality of wealth increases. I also showed that the minimum consumption requirement
plays a crucial role in determining aggregate capital, welfare and the inequality of wealth
25In a closed economy or a big open economy, when precautionary savings fall, interest rates increase and
attract inter-temporal savings. Thus, aggregate capital falls in a lower magnitude when interest rates can
adjust.
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because it determines precautionary savings.
On the other hand, while the targeted transfers system demotivates the transfer recip-
ients (who are, usually, the least skilled workers) to work because they will lose transfers,
the UBI system increases employment of such low skilled workers and total hours worked
increases. However, aggregate labor supply is almost unaffected because, more skilled house-
holds slightly reduce their labor supply. This finding is also confirmed by the data (Marinescu
2018, Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei 2017, Kangas et al. 2019).
Although consumption tax rate is the least distortionary to output to finance a UBI
system, it would require consumption tax rate to be equal to about 43% with proportional
taxation and 34.5% with progressive taxation. However, the effective consumption tax rate,
which calculates consumption tax net of transfers, decreases on average from -0.3% to -
2%. Thus, the pressure of a UBI system on the economy is much weaker than expected.
However, as high consumption tax rate is still a concern, I discuss a hybrid system where
every resident receives partial UBI ($500 monthly) and qualified, income-poor households
receive targeted transfers. The eligibility threshold of targeted transfers is reduced by $500
monthly and capital income tax rate is reduced to 5% in order to encourage savings. Such
hybrid system does not require any compromise of aggregate capital or output, requires only
a 22% consumption tax rate (the highest effective consumption tax rate equals 14%), and
increases aggregate welfare by 7.9% as CEV. More interestingly, such a system does not
reduce the welfare of the asset rich and eliminates targeted transfers as every household
earns above the threshold.
This paper is one of the pioneering papers in the analysis of the UBI system in a macroe-
conomic model framework. My analysis shows that regardless of the scepticism, a UBI
system is feasible, and with a proper administration it increases welfare without affecting
output and welfare of the asset rich. Because of its potential, this topic requires more re-
search. The benefits and costs, as well as incentives associated with the UBI system should
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME SYSTEM 56
be explored more for different types of risks (unemployment or aggregate shocks) and differ-
ent groups of people (Families with children, single mothers, people with disabilities, people
with health issues, retirees) in different scenarios (for developing economies, or economies
with big informal sector, or with high immigration).
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Table 2.1: Minimum Consumption Requirement
Average Consumption (2017) 42,785
28% of Average Consumption 11,980
Federal Poverty Threshold for individuals(2017) 12,060
Table 2.2: Parameters
Parameters Values Description
β 0.9546 Discount Factor (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
σ 1.8 Relative risk aversion (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
γ 0.28 Minimum consumption as % of C (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
γ0 0.13 Utility parameter (Heer and Trede, 2003)
γ1 10 Utility parameter (Heer and Trede, 2003)
α 0.36 Capital share (Heer and Trede, 2003)
δ 0.04 Capital depreciation rate (Heer and Trede, 2003)
τy 0.25 Income tax rate for labor income and transfers
τk 0.15 Capital income tax
µ 0.196 Share of government expenditures in output (Heer and Trede, 2003)




Wealth Gini 0.53 0.85
Earnings Gini 0.40 0.67
Income Gini 0.42 0.58
Consumption Gini 0.20 0.31
Transfers as % output 2.4% 3.6%
% of adult welfare recipients 15.3% 13.1%
Labor Force Participation Rate 84.7% 83.1%
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Table 2.4: Benchmark and UBI Models
Benchmark UBI
Agg. Capital 100 84
Agg. Labor 100 98.6
Hours worked 100 109.4
Agg. Output 100 93.1
Agg. Consumption 100 96.6
Interest Rate 100 113.5
Wage Rate 100 93.1
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.447
Earnings Gini 0.339 0.351
Income Gini 0.299 0.238
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.141
Transfers as % output 2.4% 33.7%
Consumption tax rate 5.6% 43.1%
Avg Effective policy tax rate -0.3% -2.1%
Welfare gain as CEV - 15.7%
Table 2.5: The wealth quintiles in Benchmark and UBI models. Percentages show the share
of the wealth of the given quintile in total wealth. The Wealth distribution for the U.S. is
taken from Benhabib et al. (2015)
.
The Distribution of Wealth
Percentiles 0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100%
Data (SCF 2007) 0% 0% 5% 11% 84%
Bench: shares 3.3% 9.8% 17.6% 26.8% 42.5%
UBI: shares 1.8% 8.4% 17.1% 27.3% 45.4%
Mean Values
Bench 0.148 0.442 0.790 1.203 1.91
UBI 0.067 0.317 0.646 1.032 1.712
Table 2.6: Mean values of assets and standard deviations by productivity types for Bench-
mark and UBI models
The Distribution of Wealth
Productivity Types Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Bench: Mean 0.434 0.695 0.957 1.200 1.208
UBI: Mean 0.356 0.569 0.794 1.015 1.040
% change -18% -18.1% -17% -15.4% -13.9%
Standard Deviations
Bench 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006
UBI 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005
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Table 2.7: Benchmark Model VS Tax-Financed and Foreign Aid Financed UBI
Benchmark Tax-Financed UBI UBI-Foreign Aid
Agg. Capital 100 84 80.7
Agg. Labor 100 98.6 94.5
Hours worked 100 109.4 104.5
Agg. Output 100 93.1 89.3
Agg. Consumption 100 96.6 128.8
Interest Rate 100 113.5 110.7
Wage Rate 100 93.1 94.5
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.447 0.448
Earnings Gini 0.339 0.351 0.353
Income Gini 0.299 0.238 0.241
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.141 0.142
Transfers as % output 2.4% 33.7% 32.1%
Consumption tax rate 5.6% 43.1% 1.4%
Welfare gain as CEV - 15.7% 51.1%
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Table 2.8: Benchmark Model VS UBI Model Financed with Various Tax Policies. In the
second column we see the benchmark model with targeted transfers. In the third column, the
consumption tax rate is fixed at the benchmark rate, while an income tax rate is calibrated to
balance UBI payments. In the fourth column, a progressive income tax scheme is introduced,
while in the last column, lower, 5% tax rate applies to capital income.
Bench UBI UBI UBI
Cons Income Progressive low τk
Agg. Capital 100 73.3 82.7 89
Agg. Labor 100 97.4 97.1 98.4
Hours worked 100 106.7 94.7 90.3
Agg. Output 100 87.5 91.6 94.9
Agg. Consumption 100 93.2 92.4 97.6
Interest Rate 100 89.8 110.8 96.4
Wage Rate 100 121 94.4 106.6
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.412 0.468 0.444
Labor Income Gini 0.339 0.358 0.352 0.352
Income Gini 0.299 0.218 0.243 0.242
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.138 0.143 0.142
Capital Income tax rate 15% 15% 15% 5%
Labor Income tax rate 25% 51.8% 25% 25%
Consumption tax rate 5.6% 5.6% 34.5% 45.7%
Avg Effective Policy tax rate -0.3% -8% -10% 0.1%
Welfare as CEV - 19% 7.5% 15.9%
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Table 2.9: Different Transfers Schemes
Bench UBI Partial UBI Hybrid 50%, Hybrid 50%,
100% 50% τk = 15% τk = 5%
Agg. Capital 100 84 94.7 94.5 99.7
Agg. Labor 100 98.6 101.2 101.1 101
Hours worked 100 109.4 113.6 113.6 113.2
Agg. Output 100 93.1 98.9 98.7 100.5
Agg. Consumption 100 96.6 100.2 100.2 100.7
Interest Rate 100 113.5 104.3 104.4 100.9
Wage Rate 100 93.1 97.6 97.6 99.5
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.447 0.413 0.412 0.409
Labor Income Gini 0.339 0.351 0.345 0.345 0.346
Income Gini 0.299 0.238 0.265 0.266 0.265
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.141 0.159 0.159 0.159
Consumption tax rate 5.6% 43.1% 18.8% 18.8% 21.9%
Avg Effective Policy tax rate -0.3% -2.1% 0.2% 0.2% 2.8%
Welfare as CEV - 15.7% 8.8% 8.9% 7.9%
Table 2.10: Benchmark and UBI Models with and without Borrowing
Bench UBI UBI
No borr. No Borr. Borr
Agg. Capital 100 84 77.4
Agg. Labor 100 98.6 99.1
Agg. Output 100 93.1 94.1
Agg. Consumption 100 96.6 95.8
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.447 0.599
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.141 0.152
Welfare gain as CEV - 15.7% 18.3%
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Table 2.11: Benchmark Models with and without Minimum Consumption Requirement
Minimum consumption 0% of Ct 28% of Ct 40% of Ct
Agg. Capital 73.6 100 105.3
Agg. Labor 91.7 100 104.2
Agg. Output 84.7 100 104.6
Agg. Consumption 88.8 100 104.4
Interest Rate 115.1 100 99.3
Wage Rate 115.1 100 100.4
Wealth Gini 0.499 0.402 0.393
Earnings Gini 0.353 0.339 0.351
Income Gini 0.319 0.299 0.295
Consumption Gini 0.198 0.176 0.163
Welfare gain as CEV 51.4% - -14.9%
Table 2.12: Benchmark and UBI Models with Different Minimum Consumption Require-
ments
Bench UBI Bench UBI Bench UBI
Min Consumption 28% 28% 40% 40% 0 0
Agg. Capital 100 84 100 81.5 100 91.6
Agg. Labor 100 98.6 100 96.8 100 96.8
Agg. Output 100 93.1 100 91 100 95.4
Wealth Gini 0.402 0.447 0.393 0.446 0.499 0.50
Consumption Gini 0.176 0.141 0.163 0.117 0.198 0.155
Welfare gain as CEV - 15.7% - 15.1% - 17%
CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME SYSTEM 63
Table 2.13: Benchmark Model VS UBI Model. Column 3 and 4 present results for a benchmark
and UBI models with GHH preferences. While Columns 4 and 5 present results of benchmark
and UBI models for small open economy (SOE). Aggregate variables are normalizes to 100s in
benchmark models.
Bench UBI Bench UBI
GHH GHH SOE SOE
Agg. Capital 100 76.4 100 56.8
Agg. Labor 100 101.3 100 104.8
Hours worked 100 124.8 100 116.7
Agg. Output 100 91.5 100 84.1
Agg. Consumption 100 96 100 76
Interest Rate 100 119.8 100 100
Wage Rate 100 90.3 100 80.2
Wealth Gini 0.39 0.413 0.394 0.461
Labor Income Gini 0.32 0.376 0.343 0.346
Income Gini 0.363 0.251 0.295 0.22
Consumption Gini 0.235 0.172 0.175 0.128
Consumption tax rate 7.1% 41.6% 2.3% 45.5%
Avg Effective Policy tax rate -5.7% -5% -1.1% -1.1%
Welfare as CEV - 25.6% - -7.5%
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Figure 2.1: Effective Consumption Tax Rates in the UBI System
The effective consumption tax rate in the baseline system with targeted transfers coincides with
the consumption tax rate for transfer non-recipients and equals to -100% for transfer recipients
who hold no wealth. The efective consumption tax rate in the UBI system is negative for asset
poor and low income households who consume less and thus received transfers are greater than
the consumption taxes they pay.
Figure 2.2: The Distributions of Wealth
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Figure 2.3: The Decision Rules of Labor Supply by Wealth and Productivity Type
Figure 2.4: The Decision Rules of Consumption by Wealth and Productivity Type
Wealth density functions are given in order to illustrate the relative importance of a change in
consumption.
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Gains as CEV
Figure 2.6: Output and Welfare with Different Annual UBI Transfers
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Figure 2.7: Output and Welfare in Hybrid Models with Different Annual UBI Transfers
Figure 2.8: Effective Tax Rates by Wealth and Productivity Type in the Hybrid System with
50%-UBI.
Chapter 3
Universal Basic Income in the Face of
Wage Losses as a Result of Increased
Automation
3.1 Introduction
An accelerated automation of production processes creates fears of massive unemployment
because robots can replace labor and reduce their share in value added. On the other
hand, automation increases productivity of capital and labor in the tasks where robots
cannot displace labor. Additionally, the disadvantages of labor displacement can be balanced
by the so called reinstatement effect: technological progress can create more jobs where
labor has a comparative advantage. However, as Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) find, in
the recent decades the displacement effect has been stronger than the reinstatement effect.
The COVID-19 pandemic also hastened the adoption of robots such as self-checkout kiosk
machines, chat-bots, delivery robots, recycling machines, robotic surgeries, etc (Corkery and
Gelles 2020). The Brookings Institution finds that 36 million jobs have automation potential
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(Muro et al. 2020). Frey and Osborn (2013) find that about 47% of the U.S. employment
is at risk because of computerization. Artificial intelligence (AI) is been developed so fast
that people are concerned it can substitute for skilled labor too in addition to non-skilled
labor. Bloomberg, Forbes, the Washington Post and others use AI to produce articles1
(Peiser 2019). The employment growth as well as the share of workers in occupations that
require high cognitive skills (such as science, technology, mathematics, and engineering) has
slowed since 20002. Researchers even discuss the possibility that AI substitute computational
economists anytime soon Maliar et al. (2019). In such circumstances, non-capitalists will
appear in a very disadvantaged situation at least in the short term (Berg et al. 2018).
Lowrey (2018), Yang (2018), Calsamiglia and Flamand (2019) and others discuss that a
Universal Basic Income (UBI) program can alleviate the economic hardship associated with
automation. Universal Basic Income is a program that pays a regular transfer of money to
all residents of a country. In most countries, including the United States, the government
already has poverty alleviation programs that pay targeted transfers to people with low or
no income3. Such targeted transfers system also guarantees that everyone receives survival
income, however, it distorts labor supply decisions as households that qualify for transfers
do not work (Chapter 2). In Chapter 2, I find that, the UBI system rises the welfare of
the asset-poor households significantly because they work and earn income in addition to
unconditional transfers. With fast-growing automation, UBI programs might provide higher
1For example, Bloomberg uses AI technology named Cyborg to write articles based on
financial reports. Forbes uses AI named Bertie to prepare drafts and templates for re-
porters. The Washington Post uses Heliograf. The Guardian assigned GPT3, OpenAI’s pow-







3These targeted transfers take different forms such as cash assistance, food stamps, health insurance,
unemployment insurance, tax credit or tuition subsidy
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welfare gain than targeted transfers system because wages will fall at least in the short term
(Berg et al. 2018).
In this paper I evaluate the short term and long term impacts of automation on aggregate
capital, labor, welfare, and cross-sectional distributions if it continues to grow at the same
rate as in the last three decades and I discuss the implications of different tax-transfer systems
for output and welfare. The baseline model assumes a targeted transfer system where people
need to meet income eligibility criteria to qualify for transfers. I use an Aiyagari (1994) type
heterogeneous agent model, where agents differ in abilities and wealth and face idiosyncratic
earnings risk. Individuals also have a minimum consumption requirement. As in Berg et al.
(2018), capital takes two forms: traditional capital and robot capital. Labor services can
be conducted either by robots or by humans. The production function has a Cobb-Douglas
form and combines traditional capital and labor services. I calibrate the baseline model to
match the evolution of the labor share in the last three decades and other key statistics
of the US economy. Then, I calculate the impact of doubling the productivity of robots
on the baseline economy with targeted transfers and contrast it with the universal basic
income scheme, where the UBI covers the basic consumption requirement and the transfers
system is financed by consumption tax. Lastly, I discuss the evolution of robot productivity
with a hybrid system as in Chapter 2, where every household receives 50% of subsistence
income and qualified households receive targeted transfers for which the maximum amount
of transfers and the eligibility thresholds equal 50% of subsistence requirement. As discussed
in Chapter 2, such a system is more effective as it is less demanding for output than the UBI
system and enhances welfare in contrast with the targeted transfers system.
I find that if the productivity of robots continue to grow at the same rate as it has been
growing in the last three decades, it will take 180 years to double its productivity4 (in contrast
4Note, that here I talk about doubling the productivity of robots to conduct all kinds of jobs nationwide.
Even though robots have become more than twice as productive to do certain jobs that mainly affected the
middle skilled workers, they slowly progress to substitute many low-skilled or high-skilled labor (Acemoglu
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with its value in 1990s) and the share of labor will fall to 50% in the new equilibrium if the
targeted transfers system is maintained. As the productivity of robots increases, the demand
for funds increase, and the interest rate increases. As robots substitute for labor, the wage
rate decreases. Thus, households rely less on labor earnings and start to accumulate more
capital for precautionary reasons. Additionally, households save more for inter-temporal
motives too because of high interest rates. As precautionary savings are more relevant for the
asset poor households, people in the lower tail of the wealth distribution save relatively more
and thus, the inequality of wealth reduces in the baseline economy. As households become
wealthier, the inequality of consumption and disposable income decreases too. However,
the inequality of labor earnings increases because some unskilled households start to work as
they no longer qualify for transfers because of higher wealth and thus, higher interest income.
Even though, aggregate labor supply is almost unaffected, output increases by 15.9% because
of higher savings. Funds mainly go into robot rather than traditional capital. Regardless of
higher output and lower inequality, aggregate welfare measured as CEV reduces significantly
in the baseline economy with more productive robots.
If instead economy transfers to a UBI system after productivity of robots start to in-
crease, I find that households reduce their precautionary savings significantly because of the
wealth effect of a UBI program (Chapter 2) and thus, output increases only by 4% in con-
trast with the old baseline economy with low robot productivity and is lower by 12% than
output in the new baseline system with targeted transfers and doubled robot productivity.
Also, as discussed in Chapter 2, because precautionary motives are stronger for asset poorer
households, their savings are affected more and thus, the inequality of wealth increases in the
UBI system. In overall, aggregate labor supply falls slightly relative to the baseline economy
with targeted transfers, however, the supply of low skilled workers increases significantly
because of unconditional transfers. The inequality of labor earnings increases. Regardless of
and Autor 2011).
CHAPTER 3. AUTOMATION AND UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 72
higher wealth and earnings inequalities, the inequality of disposable income and consumption
decreases more than in the baseline economy with targeted transfers. The aggregate welfare
measured as CEV increases significantly by 15.4% in contrast with initial equilibrium with
low robot productivity (while aggregate welfare falls by 6.2% in the targeted transfers system
with doubled robot productivity). Also, in the new equilibrium with doubled robot produc-
tivity, the share of labor decreases in a smaller magnitude than in the baseline economy and
equals 54%.
I find that the Hybrid system with partial targeted transfers and partial UBI is a better
alternative to the baseline and UBI systems as it balances the trade-off between output
growth and welfare. If the economy transfers to a hybrid system, in the long term, output
increases by 11.6% and is only 4% lower than it would be in the new baseline economy with
doubled robot productivity5. Aggregate welfare increases by 4% in the hybrid system and
thus, is 10.2% higher than in the new baseline economy with doubled robot productivity.
There are several caveats to my analysis. In this Chapter, an increase in the productivity
of robots is not skill-specific and robots can substitute any kind of labor, while Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) find that robots mainly substitute for the middle skilled workers. However,
Berg et al. (2018) find no significant differences in their model outcomes regardless of the
robots’ ability to substitute workers with or without a certain skill. Thus, I choose a simpler
model for my analysis where robots can do all kinds of jobs (There is an increasing concern
that robots may conduct all kinds of jobs regardless of skill. Berg et al. 2018). Second,
I assume a constant elasticity of substitution, while another approach could be that when
robots become more productive, they substitute more workers in the same task, and thus
the elasticity of substitution between robots and workers increases. However, this is left for
future research. Third, I assume that a change in the productivity of robots is exogenous.
5As discussed in Chapter 2, further gain in output in the hybrid system can be achieved by lowering the
tax rate on the interest income
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An interesting extension would be to include research and development that will allow en-
dogenous productivity change. However, this is also left for future research. Despite this,
this paper is important because it sets out a framework to analyze automation and its im-
plications for output and welfare, and the role of a tax/transfer policies in the presence of
accelerated automation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces a model with targeted
transfers system, and Section 3.3 provides a model with UBI. Section 3.4 investigates the





There is a representative firm that employs labor Lt, traditional capital Kt and robot capital
Zt to produce output Y and maximize profit. In the baseline model, I assume that robots
can substitute labor in all tasks. As Berg et al. (2018) find, the results of such model is
robust to the outcomes of the models where robots cannot substitute labor in all tasks. the
production function is the following



















CHAPTER 3. AUTOMATION AND UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 74
and σ1 is the elasticity of substitution between labor and robots, and b denotes the produc-
tivity of robot capital. Because robots and labor are substitutes, σ1 > 1. Berg et al. (2018)
put K and V as a CES nest with the elasticity of substitution equal to 0.5 that makes K and
V gross complements. For simplicity, I put them as a Cobb-Douglas production function
that is a special case of CES production function with the elasticity of substitution between
K and V be equal to 1, and cross partial derivatives are positive, QKZ > 0, QkL > 0, and
QLZ > 0.
The price of final goods is set to unity for simplicity. Thus, the profit maximization
problem for firm is the following:
max
Kt,Zt,Lt
Q(Kt, Zt, Lt)− wtLt − rt(Kt + Zt) (3.3)
where wt is the wage rate and rt is a rental rate that is the same for robot and traditional
capital. Thus, from profit maximization, it implies that:
QK(Kt, Zt, Lt) = QZ(Kt, Zt, Lt) (3.4)
We can solve this equation for Kt = F (Zt, Lt). Thus, firm’s maximization problem
reduces to two-variables and is solvable:
max
Zt,Lt
Q(F (Zt, Lt), ZtLt)− wtLt − rt
(


















If we solve Equation (3.4) for Kt, we will get:














Change in Productivity of Robots
As the annual increase in the number of robots per thousand workers (Figure 3.1) and
the annual decrease in the share of labor (Figure 3.2) have been more or less constant in
the recent 30 years, I assume that the productivity of robots improves linearly. Thus, the
productivity of robots, b, increases by the same amount until it reaches the new steady state
level in T years. Thus, the productivity of robots at period t can be written as
bt =

bt−1 + s(b̄− b0) if t ≤ T
bt−1 if t > T
(3.8)
where s = 1
T
, b̄ is the new steady state level of robot productivity, b0 is the initial period
productivity, and bt and bt−1 are the productivity of robots in period t and t-1 respectively.
Since b denotes productivity of robots, or robot input augmenting technology, when b
increases, it becomes cheaper to employ robots, because each unit of robot can now produce
more and marginal product of robots increases:
QZb > 0, (3.9)
where QZb is the derivative of marginal return on z with respect to b.
Now, we need to evaluate the impact of a change in b on the demand on other inputs.
To see this, first, I want to discuss a simple scenario and thus I ignore the adjustment costs
of traditional and robot capital that are present in (Berg et al. 2018). Because marginal
product of robots increases with a change in b, the demand on Z increases too. As a result,
interest rates rise and K decreases.













Since robots and labor are net substitutes, σ1 > 1, and (1− σ1) < 0, and thus, Kb < 0.








































When the share of labor and robots is high, increase in the productivity of robots causes
wages as well as the share of labor in the value added to fall (because σ1¿1). It is important
to note that the right hand side in the above condition is decreasing in σ1 meaning that the
bigger the elasticity of substitution between labor and robot capital, the bigger is the fall
in wages after an increase in the productivity of robots. For σ1 >
1
α
, the RHS in Equation
(3.12) becomes negative, thus, it will always be lower than the left hand side and wages will




for robots and labor to be gross substitutes. But, because the size of robots increases with an
increase in b over time (that will increase the size of traditional capital and K will increase
returns on labor), wages will begin to rise. Depending on the parameters in Equation (3.12)
and the size of labor and robots, wages have potential to rise in the long run.
Now we need to see how increase the the productivity of robots affect the supply of labor.
Because in this model people receive utility from leisure, the supply of labor will be affected
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by changes in wages and interest rates. Because in my model households are heterogeneous in
wealth and earnings potential, their response will also be different. If condition in Equation
(3.12) is satisfied, that happens for sufficiently high σ1, wages fall. The impact on the
aggregate labor depends on the strengths of the wealth and substitution effects.
In contrast with Berg et al. (2018), my model allows working households to accumulate
capital. Thus, when wages decline and interest rate increases after an increase in the pro-
ductivity of robots, saving becomes attractive. Thus, households will tend to accumulate
more wealth over time, distributions of wealth change, and my model should capture more
complex outcomes of automation.
Households Problem in a Benchmark Model
Households’ problem is defined as in Equations (2.1)-(2.8).
Government
The government’s problem is defined as in Equations (2.12)-(2.14).
Value Function
The households problem can be written in recursive form as in Equation (2.15).
Preferences
Preferences are defined as in Equation (2.16).
Market Clearing
Market clearing conditions are defined as in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2. And





af(e, a)da = K + Z (3.13)
C +K ′ + Z ′ +G = F (K,L) + (1− δ)(K + Z) (3.14)
Calibration
Most of the calibrated parameters are as suggested by Heer and Trede (2003) and Berg et al.
(2018). The elasticity of substitution between labor and robot capital, σ1, and cost share of
labor in the production of labor services, ψ, come from Berg et al. (2018). However, while
they suggest the elasticity of substitution between traditional capital and labor services to
be 0.5, in my model, I set it to 1 because I put them as Cobb-Douglas production function
for computational simplicity. Therefore, Berg et al. (2018) suggestion for the beginning pro-
ductivity of robots (b=0.5) does not provide reasonable outcomes in my model and instead,
I set the steady state productivity of robots to be 0.077 that is needed to match the share
of labor in 1990, the time when exposure to robots was low (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020).
I set the income tax rate, τy, to be equal to 0.25 and the consumption tax rate, τc
to balance the government budget constraint. The model parameters are given in Table
3.1. The choice for the parameters of discount rate, relative risk aversion, and subsistence
consumption are as in Chapter 2. Income process and transition probabilities are also defined
as in Chapter 2.
3.2.2 Benchmark Model Outcomes in the New Stationary Equi-
librium
I discuss the results of 2 possible changes in robot productivity: when b changes from 0.077
to 0.09, and when b doubles and changes from 0.077 to 0.154. 0.077 is the calibrated value
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of robot productivity that would keep the share of labor at 0.64 as it was before 90s. 0.09 is
the calibrated value of robot productivity that would describe the share of labor in around
2015, at 0.61. Thus, in the first scenario, I discuss the long-run equilibrium outcomes of an
increase in the robot productivity until today’s level. And, in the second scenario I assume
that the productivity of robots continues to grow until it doubles and reaches 0.154 and
remains constant afterwards.
The outcomes of an increase in robot productivity are in Table 3.2. In the long run,
the higher the productivity of robots, the higher the output, the higher the level of robot
capital, the lower the level of aggregate labor, the lower the wage rate, and the lower the
share of labor. The level of aggregate capital depends on the magnitude of a change in the
productivity of robots. When a change in robot productivity is low and b = 0.09, aggregate
capital decreases by 0.12% in the stationary equilibrium implying that the substitution
effect is greater than the productivity effect for aggregate capital. However, when robot
productivity doubles, productivity effect dominates the substitution effect and aggregate
capital increases too. As the productivity of robots improves, the demand on financial
resources increases, therefore, interest rates increase.
As interest rates increase, households accumulate more wealth and consume less. There-
fore, aggregate consumption falls and it never rebounds given this calibration. As household
accumulate more wealth, less households meet the eligibility criteria for transfers. For the
first scenario, the percentage of transfer recipients decreases only slightly, by 0.3 percentage
points, while for the second scenario, it decreases by 2.6 percentage points. Likewise, the
share of total transfers in output decreases too. Regardless of this, consumption tax rate
that is required to balance the budget increases because wage rates and therefore, labor
income tax base, decrease significantly.
As we see, the aggregate labor decreases slightly, by less than 1% in both scenarios,
while total hours worked increases by 0.4% and 0.5% respectively in the first and the second
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scenario. This means that the relative supply of unskilled workers increases. This happens
because fewer households are eligible for transfers (because of higher interest rates) who start
to work. This increases the inequality of labor earnings slightly.
It is also worth noting that the supply of asset-poor labor increases because of the wealth
effect of low wages and also because saving becomes more attractive because of higher interest
rates. The supply of wealthier households decreases slightly because of the wealth effect of
higher interest rates. Therefore, the inequalities of wealth and therefore, total income, and
consumption reduce slightly.
When the productivity of robots increases, in the long run, the distribution of wealth
becomes less skewed to the right meaning that the poverty rate declines and the share of the
middle class households increases. This happens because interest rates rise and it becomes
more attractive to accumulate wealth. (Figure 3.3).
Even though households on average become wealthier and the inequalities of wealth,
income, and consumption decreases, aggregate welfare, measured as Consumption Equivalent
Variation (CEV) decreases the bigger the change in the productivity of robots: by 2% in
the first and by 6.2% in the second scenario. The decrease in welfare is highest for the
asset poorer and less skilled households. This is mainly because of lower wages and lower
consumption. Welfare increase only for the wealthiest households because labor income is
less relevant for them, while they gain because of higher interest rates. Value functions
associated with doubling the productivity of robots are given in Figure 3.4.
3.2.3 Benchmark Model with Alternative Tax Policies
The main problem associated with automation is that wages decrease and therefore, the
welfare (measured as consumption equivalent variation) of the asset poorer households de-
creases. Thus, if the government varies tax policies that will limit the accumulation of robot
capital and redistribute income towards asset poorer households, it might provide welfare
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gain. Thus, first I discuss a scenario when capital income tax increases. And, then I will
discuss a scenario where in addition to increasing capital income tax, I reduce the labor
income tax rate (which is the same as the income tax on transfers).
In the first scenario, I increase the capital income tax from 25% to 35%. With higher
capital income tax households have less incentives to save that should increase interest rates
and thus, the cost of holding robots (as well as traditional capital). Table 3.3 presents results.
Higher capital income tax reduces both, traditional and robot capital as expected, however,
the size of robot capital is affected more. Traditional capital will be lower by 7% and robot
capital will be lower by 30% in the new steady state with high capital income tax in contrast
with the steady state by 25% of capital income tax. Wage rate and employment are still
low and almost unchanged by this tax policy. Output is 4.66% lower (only 11.2% higher
than initial steady state with low robot productivity) because of lower capital. However,
increased capital income tax allows consumption tax rate to fall that allow the asset poorer
households to afford higher consumption and thus, increases their welfare by 3.2% as CEV
in contrast with the economy with high robot productivity and 25% capital income tax (and
the fall in welfare as CEV equals only 3% in contrast with the initial steady state with low
robot productivity and 25% capital income tax).
As increasing capital income tax alleviates wage reduction pressure for asset poor house-
holds, now I would like to test if reducing the labor and transfers income tax from 25% to
20%, along with high, 35% capital income tax, will create additional increase in the welfare.
The results are in the last column of Table 3.3. Lower income tax allows households to
accumulate more wealth, thus, the sizes of traditional and robot capital are higher here than
with 35% capital income tax and 25% labor/transfers income tax. Also, the households in
the lower tail of the wealth distribution gain in welfare because low income taxes allow them
to afford higher consumption. However, because the income tax rate is lower, the consump-
tion tax rate that is required to balance the budget is higher that reduces the welfare of
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the wealthier households and aggregate welfare is 1.2% lower than in the economy with 25%
labor income and 35% capital income tax rates (and with high robot productivity). However,
welfare is still higher than in the economy with capital and labor/transfers income tax rates
of 25%.
3.3 Standard Model with Universal Basic Income Fi-
nanced by Balanced Budget
I consider UBI model that is financed by a balanced budget. My UBI model is not revenue
neutral. Because everyone receives a universal basic transfer, the government needs to finance
such a system, and thus, with the UBI, both, revenue and costs of the government rise. At
the same time, there is no other targeted transfer in the model because the UBI system
substitutes all the safety net programs. The framework of the basic model is provided in the
next subsection.
Households
The households’ and Governments problems are defined as in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter 2.
The set up of the model is the same as in the previous standard model with the difference
that everyone receives the benefit of ỹt
(1+τc)
(1−τy) . The transfer is supposed to be sufficient to
survive without any labor or capital income.
and
ct ≥ max{ỹBench|b = 0.077, 28%CUBI} (3.15)
where CUBI is average consumption in the stationary equilibrium, ỹBench is the minimum con-
sumption requirement in the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model with targeted
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transfers and initial robot productivity. With this condition, the minimum consumption in
the UBI system is at least the minimum consumption in the benchmark model with targeted
transfers because standards of living is not likely to decrease if economy transits to a UBI
system.
Preferences, value functions and the market equilibrium conditions are all similar to the
benchmark model with transfers.
Firms
The firm’s problem is the same as in the benchmark model.
Calibration
Calibration parameters are the same as in the benchmark model. Income tax rates are fixed
and the consumption tax rate is calibrated to balance the budget constraint.
3.3.1 Results in Stationary Equilibrium
The long-run findings of a UBI system are consistent with the findings of Chapter 2. If
a rise in robot productivity is responded by a UBI policy, in the long run, savings do not
increase as much as it would in the baseline system because of lower precautionary needs,
therefore, traditional capital, robot capital and output are lower than in the benchmark
model. Aggregate capital falls by 12.4% and robot capital increases only by 67%6 (Table
3.4). Aggregate labor falls by the same magnitude as in the benchmark system, by 3%,
while hours worked increases more, by 7.6%: low skilled workers work more because of
unconditional transfers. The consumption tax rate that is required to balance the budget
equals 42.8%, however, the average effective consumption tax rate7 equals -1.6% and the
6In the baseline economy with targeted transfers, the size of robot capital increases by 115%
7The effective consumption tax rate is calculated as the percentage of the consumption tax paid minus
transfers in the consumption
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maximum effective consumption tax rate equals 24.7% for the wealthiest households (Figure
3.5).
As in Chapter 2, the inequality of wealth increases and the distribution of wealth becomes
more skewed to the right (Figure 3.6) because precautionary savings are more relevant for
the asset poorer households and the inequalities of consumption and income decreases more
than in the benchmark model. Hours worked increases because transfers are unconditional
and more people are in the labor force, while aggregate labor decreases slightly more than
in the benchmark system as households work for fewer hours because of the wealth effect
of UBI. Thus, the inequality of labor earnings is higher in the UBI system than in the
benchmark system. Also, wage rate decreases and interest rate increases slightly more in the
UBI system than in the benchmark system.
However, aggregate consumption is actually slightly higher in the UBI system than in the
benchmark system after a change in the productivity of robots. This finding is in contrast
with Chapter 2, that finds that with the UBI system (with no robot capital) aggregate
consumption falls in the long term by 3.4%. This is because interest rate increases by a
smaller magnitude in the UBI system in the presence of automation (by 6.3% in contrast
with 13.5%) and thus, households reduce their savings more rather than consumption.
While welfare as CEV decreases by 6.2% in the benchmark system when productivity of
robots double, welfare as CEV increases significantly, by 15.4% in the UBI system. While
welfare of the asset poor households is significantly higher than it is with the benchmark
system, a reduction in the welfare of the wealthier people is very low (Figure 3.7).
As we have seen in the previous section, the share of labor reduces significantly in the
baseline system after an increase in the robot productivity. The share of labor decreases in
the UBI system too, however, is is 4 percentage points higher than in the benchmark system
and equals 54%. This is mainly because output increases only by 3.5% in the UBI system,
while wage rate and employment are not significantly different from the benchmark system
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after a change in robot productivity.
3.3.2 UBI System with Low Capital Income Tax
The main problem associated with the UBI system is the fall of savings because of precau-
tionary reasons. Chapter 2 discusses that lowering capital income tax rates will increase
savings in the UBI system because of inter-temporal reasons. I do similar exercise here. I
reduce capital income tax to 5%. Results are in the last column of Table 3.4. With low, 5%
capital income tax rate, output is only 3% lower than in the baseline model with targeted
transfers, and the inequality of wealth is almost unaffected. Consumption inequality reduces
again and the welfare measured as consumption equivalent variation increases by 10.3%.
If we reduce capital income tax rate further to 0%, the UBI system will provides almost
same level of output and even higher levels of both traditional and robot capital than the
baseline model with targeted transfers. This UBI system also effectively reduce income and
consumption inequality and increases aggregate welfare as CEV by 8.7%. The consump-
tion tax rate increases significantly, however, average effective consumption tax rate equals
10.5%. Thus, it is possible to set up a welfare-enhancing UBI system without compromising
aggregate capital and output.
3.4 Hybrid System with 50% of Basic Income and 50%
of Targeted Transfers
As discussed in Chapter 2, a hybrid system of partial UBI and partial targeted transfers
performs better as it is less demanding for output and still provides a significant gain in
welfare and reduction of consumption inequality. Thus, now, I discuss similar Hybrid system
of universal basic income and targeted transfers systems as discussed in Chapter 2, where
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universal payments and the threshold for targeted transfers equal 50% of subsistence. Thus,










that is same as Equation (2.45) and h=0.5 and the minimum consumption in the hybrid
economy cannot be lower than the minimum consumption in the baseline economy with
targeted transfers and low robot productivity. Thus,
ct ≥ max{ỹBench|b = 0.077, 28%CUBI} (3.17)
.
The results of hybrid system with high robot productivity are given in the last column
of Table 3.5. The findings are similar to the ones of Chapter 2: in the hybrid system,
aggregate savings and output are much higher than in the UBI system and slightly lower
than in the benchmark system. In the Hybrid system aggregate output increases by 11.6%,
by 4 percentage points less than in the benchmark system and 9 percentage points more
than the UBI system. Consumption tax is in the reasonable range, 23%, and aggregate
welfare measured as CEV increases by 4%. Interest rate and the share of labor are similar
to the benchmark model, while the inequality coefficients lie between the benchmark and
UBI levels: Wealth and earnings inequality increases slightly in contrast with the benchmark
system (but not as much as in the UBI system), and the inequalities of consumption and
income are reduced.
Thus, while the benchmark system provides highest output and the UBI system provides
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highest welfare gain, a hybrid system is a great alternative to balance welfare and output
growth.
3.4.1 Hybrid System with Low Capital Income Tax
In the hybrid system that pays 50% of subsistence requirement to every resident and Targeted
transfers to eligible individuals8, output is still 4.2% smaller than in the benchmark system
because of precautionary savings motive9. As in the UBI system discussed in Sections 2.4.1
and 3.3.2, further gain in output can be achieved by reducing the capital income tax rate.
Lower capital income tax rate will increase savings, and thus, output. If in the hybrid system
we reduce capital income tax to 5%, output will actually be 5% bigger and the aggregate
welfare (measures as CEV) will be 1%10 higher than in the Benchmark system with targeted
transfers (The last column of Table 3.5).
Thus, even if the goal of the government is to maximize output, this can be achieved
better by alternative tax/transfer policies that enhances welfare.
3.5 Transition Dynamics
Figure 3.8 shows transition dynamics with the benchmark and the UBI system.
As robots become productive the response of the representative firm is to employ more
robots. For this, the demand for funds increases and thus, interest rates increase in both
Benchmark and UBI systems. As the firm needs more financial resources to purchase the
robot capital and it takes time to accumulate such resources, at first, it reduces the amount
of traditional capital very slightly (as discussed in Section 3.2). It takes more than 60
8whose income is less than 50% of subsistence requirement
9For the models discussed in this paper, the precautionary savings motive is strongest in the benchmark
system and weakest in the UBI system
10Households, on average, would pay 1% of their consumption to avoid the benchmark system
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years for the traditional capital to rebound in the benchmark system. The size of robot
capital increases at a constant rate in the baseline economy as the productivity of robots
increases and it stabilizes once the productivity of robots doubles and stops to increase.
Because robots are substitutes for labor, and it is getting cheaper to employ robots, wage
rate decreases steadily until the productivity of robots stops to increase. The response of
aggregate labor to a change in robot productivity and a decline in wage rate is interesting.
Initially, aggregate labor increases even though wage rates fall. This happens because the
wealth effect of wage decline dominates the substitution effect and households work for more
hours to earn subsistence income. Also, as interest rates are high, households have more
incentives to save for which they need to earn more (and consume less). Thus, aggregate
labor initially increases, and then, it decreases and stabilizes at a lower level. The variation
in aggregate labor as well as aggregate capital is very low anyway, while an increase in the
size of robot capital is very big. Therefore, aggregate output increases regardless of a decline
in aggregate labor. The share of labor decreases steadily as robots become more productive
mainly because of a decline in the wage rate. Aggregate consumption falls faster initially
again because of low wages and high interest rates. Households need to save more for both
precautionary (because of lower wages) and inter-temporal reasons (higher interest rates).
For this calibration, aggregate consumption never rebounds to its initial level. Aggregate
welfare measured as CEV also falls faster initially and then, stabilizes at a lower level.
The main difference between responses of the baseline and UBI economy is in the initial
response of transferring to the UBI system. The trends are mainly similar after first 20
years, however, the UBI economy stays at lower output and significantly higher welfare. As
robots become productive and economy switches to the UBI system, the initial response of
households is to save and work less and consume more because of less precautionary needs
associated with the UBI system (Chapter 2). Thus, initially, output declines too. Because at
first, aggregate labor decreases, the wage rate increases too initially and the welfare measured
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as CEV increases significantly. As savings decline, while productivity of robots increase and
firms need more resources, the interest rate increases more in the UBI system than in the
benchmark system. Later, as productivity of robots continue to increase, the wage rate falls
and traditional as well as robot capital and aggregate output increase, however, they are
always at a lower levels than the benchmark economy. Aggregate labor starts to increase
too after an initial drop because low wages increase precautionary needs. However, later on
it falls again as it happens in the benchmark system too and remains at a lower level. The
share of labor increases first, as wage rates increase and output decreases, and then, starts to
decrease steadily. However, in the UBI system, the share of labor is always higher than in the
benchmark system. Aggregate consumption starts to fall after an initial increase, however
it remains at a higher level than the benchmark economy. Aggregate welfare measured as
CEV also starts to fall slightly after an initial increase, however, it remains stably above
both baseline economies before and after a change in the productivity of robots.
The transition path of most variables in the hybrid system has similar shape as the UBI
path, however, is usually above it except for consumption and welfare. The consumption is
lower because precautionary savings motive is stronger. Also, the aggregate welfare measured
as CEV is lower than in the UBI system, however, is always higher than in the benchmark
system with targeted transfers.
3.6 Conclusion
While the share of labor in value added had been relatively stable around 65% before 1990,
it has been decreasing in the last three decades as the U.S. started to increase the use of
industrial robots (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020, Acemoglu and Restrepo 2019). I find that
if the productivity of robots doubles, the baseline economy with targeted transfers provides
higher output, however, reduces aggregate welfare measured as CEV, by more than 6% and
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labor share to 50% in the long-term. If instead, the economy transfers to the UBI system, the
aggregate welfare as CEV increases significantly, especially in the beginning of the transition,
however, in the long-term, it reduces output as it reduces precautionary savings. The hybrid
system with partial UBI and partial targeted transfers performs better as it is less demanding
for output while provides significant gain in welfare than the baseline economy. Further gains
in output in the UBI and Hybrid systems can be achieved by lowering capital income tax
rates.
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Table 3.1: Parameters
Parameters Values Description
β 0.9546 Discount Factor (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
σ 1.8 Relative risk aversion (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
γ 0.28 Minimum consumption as % of C (Alvarez-Pelaez and Diaz, 2005)
γ0 0.13 Utility parameter (Heer and Trede, 2003)
γ1 10 Utility parameter (Heer and Trede, 2003)
α 0.36 The share of traditional capital (Heer and Trede, 2003)
σ1 2.5 The elasticity of substitution between robots and humans (Berg et al. 2018)
ψ 0.94 Production function parameter (to match the share of labor in labor services)
b0 0.077 Calibrated initial productivity of robots (Target: the share of Labor in 1990)
b1 0.09 Calibrated productivity of robots in Sc.1 (Target: the share of Labor in 2020)
b1 0.154 Doubled productivity of robots in Sc.2
s 0.0004 Annual change in robot productivity (Target: evolution of labor share in 1990-2020)
δ 0.06 Calibrated capital depreciation rate (Target: β(1 + r − δ) < 1)
τy 0.25 Income tax rate for labor income and transfers
µ 0.196 Share of government expenditures in output (Heer and Trede, 2003)
Table 3.2: The Baseline Economy with Targeted Transfers. The baseline economy pays
transfers to households that earn below subsistence requirement.
b=0.077 b=0.09 b=0.154
Traditional Capital 100 99.88 104.71
Robot Capital 100 119.75 233.54
Agg. Labor 100 99.84 99.19
Hours worked 100 100.05 100.04
Agg. Output 100 102.02 115.86
Agg. Consumption 100 98.9 98.15
Wage rate 100 97.53 90.98
Interest rate 0.086 0.088 0.095
The Share or Labor 0.64 0.61 0.50
Wealth Gini 0.41 0.406 0.387
Earnings Gini 0.353 0.361 0.372
Consumption Gini 0.205 0.204 0.198
Income Gini 0.365 0.363 0.348
Transfers as % output 2.4% 2.2% 1.6%
Transfer Recipients 15.5% 15.2% 12.9%
Consumption tax 4.1% 4.9% 8.2%
Welfare gain as CEV - -2% -6.2%
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Table 3.3: The Baseline Economy with Alternative Tax Policies
b=0.077 b=0.154 b=0.154 b=0.154
τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.35 τk = 0.35
τy = 0.25 τy = 0.25 τy = 0.25 τy = 0.20
Traditional Capital 100 104.71 97.7 99.5
Robot Capital 100 233.54 203.9 212.5
Agg. Labor 100 99.19 98.9 100.2
Hours worked 100 100.04 99.7 100.1
Agg. Output 100 115.86 111.2 112.6
Agg. Consumption 100 98.15 98.7 98.9
Wage rate 100 90.98 90.4 90.4
Interest rate 0.086 0.095 0.097 0.097
The Share or Labor 0.64 0.50 0.515 0.515
Wealth Gini 0.41 0.387 0.395 0.401
Earnings Gini 0.353 0.372 0.369 0.366
Consumption Gini 0.205 0.198 0.20 0.202
Income Gini 0.365 0.348 0.354 0.356
Transfers as % output 2.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7%
Transfer Recipients 15.5% 12.9% 13.6% 13.9%
Consumption tax 4.1% 8.2% 3.1% 9%
Welfare gain as CEV - -6.2% -3% -4.2%
Table 3.4: The Universal Basic Income System. The Universal Basic Income system pays
subsistence income to every households regardless of their income.
Bench Bench UBI UBI UBI
b=0.077 b=0.154 b=0.154 b=0.154 b=0.154
τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.05 τk = 0
Traditional Capital 100 104.71 87.59 100.6 103.8
Robot Capital 100 233.54 167.07 221.1 235.1
Agg. Labor 100 99.19 97.17 96.4 96.3
Hours worked 100 100.04 107.6 123.6 106
Agg. Output 100 115.86 103.48 112 114.1
Agg. Consumption 100 98.15 98.28 96.8 96.5
Wage rate 100 90.98 89.93 91.2 91.6
Interest rate 0.086 0.095 0.101 0.095 0.094
The Share of Labor 0.64 0.50 0.541 0.503 0.495
Wealth Gini 0.41 0.387 0.436 0.417 0.413
Earnings Gini 0.353 0.372 0.418 0.421 0.422
Consumption Gini 0.205 0.198 0.161 0.158 0.157
Income Gini 0.365 0.348 0.26 0.253 0.251
Transfers as % output 2.2% 1.6% 29.2% 29.1 29.3%
Consumption tax rate 4.1% 8.2% 42.8% 56.7% 60.4%
Avg effective cons tax
rate
-1.7% 3.3% -1.6% -2.2% 10.5%
Welfare gain as CEV - -6.2% 15.4% 10.3% 8.7%
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Table 3.5: Hybrid Model. This Hybrid system pays 50% of subsistence requirement to every
resident and 50% of subsistence requirement to eligible households.
Bench Bench UBI Hybrid Hybrid
b=0.077 b=0.154 b=0.154 b=0.154 b=0.154
τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.25 τk = 0.05
Traditional Capital 100 104.71 87.59 99.5 113.1
Robot Capital 100 233.54 167.07 215.07 272.6
Agg. Labor 100 99.19 97.17 97.29 98.1
Hours worked 100 100.04 107.6 102.37 104
Agg. Output 100 115.86 103.48 111.63 121
Agg. Consumption 100 98.15 98.28 97.2 96.8
Wage rate 100 90.98 89.93 90.96 91.9
Interest rate 0.086 0.095 0.101 0.096 0.092
The Share of Labor 0.64 0.50 0.541 0.508 0.477
Wealth Gini 0.41 0.387 0.436 0.398 0.372
Earnings Gini 0.353 0.372 0.418 0.405 0.404
Consumption Gini 0.205 0.198 0.161 0.184 0.177
Income Gini 0.365 0.348 0.26 0.313 0.296
Transfers as % output 2.2% 1.6% 29.2% 12% 12.2%
Consumption tax rate 4.1% 8.2% 42.8% 23% 35.1%
Avg effective cons tax
rate
-1.7% 3.3% -1.6% 2% 12%
Welfare gain as CEV - -6.2% 15.4% 4% -5.2%
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Figure 3.1: Industrial robots per thousand workers in the United States and in the Europe.
Source: Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020)
Figure 3.2: The Share of Labor in the United States in 1975-2015. Source: Karabarbaunis
and Neiman (2014)
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Figure 3.3: The distributions of wealth for different levels of robot productivity
Figure 3.4: Value functions for different types of skill and wealth
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Figure 3.5: The Effective Consumption Tax Rate in The UBI System. b=0.154.
Figure 3.6: The distributions of wealth. b=0.154.
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Figure 3.7: Value functions for different types of skill and wealth
Figure 3.8: Transition Dynamics
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UBI as a Shock to Permanent Income and Prudence
In the UBI system, people receive a guaranteed payment from the government in each year
that changes the minimum value of the lifetime income for any given shock. Thus, for the
fixed income tax rate, UBI increases the present value of lifetime income, that households
want to smooth across time. Because UBI payments increase permanent income, the ex-
pected marginal utility of consumption decreases, and thus, agents tend to consume more
for any given consumption tax rate. When households are impatient and β(1 + r) < 1, they
would like to borrow against future income, thus, the UBI system reduces savings.
In addition to inter-temporal substitution and smoothing motives, the level of saving is
determined by precautionary reasons too and is associated with the coefficient of absolute
prudence. For the CRRA class of utility functions, the value of absolute prudence, which
is associated with the convexity of marginal utility function, determines the level of precau-
tionary savings and is decreasing in permanent income. Households are said to be prudent if
the third derivative of the utility function is positive, which means that the marginal utility
function is convex. Prudent households reduce consumption and increase savings for self-
insurance reasons when uncertainty increases (Leland (1968), Kimball (1989) ). Because, a
UBI system (with τy = 0) rises the expected value of permanent income, households will
reduce savings for self-insurance motives for the same level of uncertainty or variance of
future earnings. Thus, with a UBI system, in addition to smoothing motive and impatience
to consume, savings fall for precautionary reasons too.
To see this intuition, for simplicity, let’s assume that l = 1, households live for two periods
and labor income and capital income tax rates are zero (τy = 0 and τk = 0), consumption
tax rate is τc, and depreciation rate, δ = 0. By differentiating the value function to find
optimal consumption, we will get the following Euler equation
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and u is the first period utility function, while v is the second period utility function, u1
is the first derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption in period t, and v1
is the first derivative of v with respect to ct+1. Ev1 is an expected marginal utility in period
t+1.
As Leland (1968) shows, if we apply Taylor’s expansion, the above Euler condition with
uncertain income can be approximated by










where Ect+1 is expected value of consumption (when labor income is known to be equal




is the variance of consumption in t+1. Thus, for a given level of uncertainty,
the impact of a change in income or initial level of wealth depends on three terms: β(1 + r),
v1, and v3.
v3 determines the prudence of households and their precautionary savings for self-insurance
when future income stream is uncertain. When v3 > 0 (that is true with our CRRA utility
function), people are prudent and save more as a response to a rise in risk.
For now, let us assume that there is no change in τc. With the UBI system, lifetime
income increases by ỹt +
ỹt+1
1+r





ai,t + wtei,t + ỹt − (1 + τc)ci,t
)
+ ỹt+1 + wt+1ei,t+1
1 + τc
. (21)
When ct+1 increases, both v1 and v3 decrease and in order to balance the Euler equation,
consumption in period t should increase. Thus, it is clear that consumption will rise as
a response to a change in permanent income (when tax rates are fixed), but we need to
evaluate the impact of a UBI system on savings that is to see whether the first derivative of
consumption with respect to UBI payments is greater or less than 1.
To show this, let’s take a total differential of the Euler equation above with respect to
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where u2 is the second derivatives of u with respect to ct, and v2 and v4 are the second












As, u2, v2, and v4 are negative, ψ > 0.





(1 + τc)(ψ + 1 + r)
> 0, (24)
and thus, people want to borrow or dis-save against future income. On the other hand,






(1 + τc)(ψ + 1 + r)
, (25)











(1 + τc)(ψ + 1 + r)
(26)
The impact of the UBI payments on the savings depends on ψ. If ψ < 1−τc(1+r)
1+τc
, the
savings will fall, otherwise, savings will rise. If I calibrate this model with τc = 0.056 taken
from the benchmark model, r=0.0425, and 1−τc(1+r)
1+τc
= 0.892.






because v4 is no longer in the denominator. Thus, as ψ
NoPrudence < ψ, with prudent
households savings are more likely to fall in the UBI system. Prudence (v3) as well as change
in prudence with wealth (v4) are largest for the least productive and asset poorest individuals
and thus, ψ is lowest for the households in the lower tail of the wealth distribution. Also, ψ
is lower when the variance of consumption is higher.
Thus, because of a smoothing motive, impatience to consume, and less precautionary
needs, households reduce their savings with the UBI system. The least productive and asset
poor reduce their savings more because precautionary savings motive is stronger for them.
Figure 9 shows the values of ψ for two-period model with l = 1 and τy = 0, τk = 0 for
different levels of initial wealth and productivity types. As can be noticed, when there is no
change in τc, ψ is almost always less than 0.892, and it is lower for households with a low
level of wealth and productivity.
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When UBI policy is financed through consumption tax, consumption and savings respond
to a change in τc. The response of consumption to an increase in τc is
dct
dτc
= − (1 + r)ct + Ect+1
(1 + τc)(ψ + 1 + r)
. (28)
As (1+r)ct+Ect+1 equals lifetime wealth, consumption will reduce more for the wealthier
households. Thus, again, even if a UBI policy is financed through consumption tax, the
less productive and asset poorer households are more likely to reduce their savings. And,
depending which effect dominates, a wealth effect of UBI or a rise of consumption tax, the
wealthier might actually, increase their savings. Thus, the inequality of wealth is expected
to increase.
When households face a positive minimum consumption requirement, v4 becomes a func-
tion of Ect+1− ỹ, which means that a decrease in prudence is bigger, and thus, as a response
of a UBI policy, households will reduce their savings more than with zero minimum con-
sumption requirement.
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Figure 9: ψ for Different Levels of Wealth and Productivity Type
For ψ < 0.892, households reduce their savings with the UBI policy (with no change in τc). The
lower the level of ψ, the higher the decrease in savings. The variance of consumption equals the
variance of earnings.
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